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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation studies a little-known executive compensation device called dividend 
equivalent rights (DERs).  DERs entitle an executive to receive dividends, known as dividend 
equivalents (DEs), on unearned performance-based stocks and options. 
In the first essay we do empirical studies on the market reaction of news about DERs and the 
incentives that DERs can bring.  We find that about 22% of S&P500 firms allow for these 
payments and about 10% actually make such payments.  While investors react negatively to 
announcements of DE payments, DERs can be beneficial to shareholders by inducing a company 
to disgorge unproductive cash.  If a firm allows DEs to be paid on the CEO’s unearned shares it is 
four times more likely to be a dividend payer and for firms already paying dividends, dividend 
payments are larger if DEs are allowed. 
In the second essay we estimate the value of dividend equivalents that are granted on an 
executive’s unvested stock options.  We examine how much the dividend equivalents are worth to 
the executive and how costly they are to the company.  We find that the dividend equivalents that 
are paid to the executive in cash are more valuable to the executive than the ones paid out in firm 
shares.  This preference is stronger when the executive is more risk averse.  We also find that the 
executive’s non-option wealth allocation, dividend payout level, the length of the options’ vesting 
period and the percentage of options that are granted with DERs are important factors that can 
affect the subjective value of the dividend equivalents. 
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CHAPTER 1. DIVIDENDS ON UNEARNED SHARES AND CORPORATE 
PAYOUT POLICY: 
AN ANALYSIS OF DIVIDEND EQUIVALENT RIGHTS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This paper examines a widely used but little-known executive compensation instrument 
called the dividend equivalent right (DER).  DERs entitle executives to receive dividends on shares 
covered by their performance-based equity awards – shares they may not own and, in fact, may 
never own.  Those dividends are referred to as dividend equivalents (DEs) and the underlying 
shares that are not yet owned by the executives are referred to as unearned shares.  Paying 
dividends to an executive on shares he does not own seems counterintuitive because dividends, by 
definition, are a portion of the firm’s assets paid to the owners of a corporation.  If the executive 
does not own the shares, how could he claim dividends on those shares, and how does the firm 
justify dividend payments on those shares?  Serious questions obviously arise as to whether these 
payments are opaque forms of compensation. 
The amount of dividend equivalents paid to an executive is a function of two variables, the 
size of the dividends paid to shareholders and the number of shares covered by the executive’s 
equity awards.  Therefore not only is the executive able receive dividends on shares he does not 
own, but he is also able to determine the amount of dividend equivalents he will receive because 
he can influence the per share dividend declaration.  A potential agency problem arises – could it 
be that the executive manipulates the firm’s corporate dividend policy to increase his own wealth?  
The unique aspect of dividend equivalent rights is that the executive does not actually own the 
shares.  He may own them at some time in the future if performance conditions are met.  The 
dividends on shares owned by the executives are relatively transparent.  But the DE payments are 
often poorly disclosed and firms’ policies regarding DEs in most cases are not transparent.  This 
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instrument is not widely known.  There has been very little academic research on DEs, and they 
are not commonly mentioned in trade publications.  
The facts that DE payments are poorly disclosed and that firms’ policies regarding DEs in 
most cases are obscure seem to suggest that DERs are tools to help executives extract rents from 
shareholders without much public attention.  However the potential agency problem described 
above may be only half of the story and the negative half to boot.  There is a positive side to this 
instrument.  DERs have great potential to reduce another agency problem.  For example, executive 
stock options as a widely used form of compensation suffer from the criticism that they potentially 
discourage firms from paying dividends or paying dividends of the optimal size.  There is both 
empirical and anecdotal evidence supporting that non-dividend protected executive stock options 
are associated with lower dividends (Lambert et al. 1989; Fenn & Liang 2001; Verizon 2003).  By 
paying lower dividends, executives can hoard cash or engage in empire-building by investing in 
inferior or, at best, value-neutral assets.  Because dividend equivalents can only be paid to 
executives when common dividends are paid to shareholders, granting DERs to executives on their 
unearned shares can encourage firms with unproductive cash to disgorge it by initiating dividends 
or by paying higher dividends to shareholders. 
DERs are granted on the underlying shares of executives’ incentive equity awards.  These 
shares are either time-vested, performance-vested, or a combination of both.  DERs granted on 
time-vested shares such as time-vested restricted stock or units should not necessarily be viewed 
in the same manner as those on unearned shares.  A holder of time-based restricted stock or units 
will eventually own the shares as long as he stays employed by the firm.  Although there is the 
possibility that the holder will leave the firm and forfeit the shares or be fired, the condition that 
must be met to own the shares is not terribly onerous.  It is almost a sure thing that those shares 
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will become owned by the executive.  They are just less illiquid because the executive cannot sell 
them.  Thus we can view the time-vested restricted stock or units as owned shares by the executive.   
DERs granted on performance–based shares, however, may send up a red flag.  Shares that 
are subject to performance hurdles are earned by the executives only when specified performance 
goals have been achieved.  Before the performance goals have been met, the shares are unearned 
shares.  If the performance goals are missed the shares will never be earned.  One form of 
performance-based shares mainly includes unvested performance-vested restricted stock or units 
and unearned performance shares.  Another form includes shares underlying stock options because 
options may expire unexercised.   
DERs granted with unearned shares not only give executives the right to receive dividends 
in advance of full ownership of the shares but also to receive dividends on shares that they may 
never own.  One may suspect that DERs paid on unearned shares are rare cases featuring little-
known firms paying their CEOs stealthily.  Surprisingly, the practice is not rare, even for large and 
well-known U.S. firms.  This study finds that 10 percent of S&P500 firms are making such DE 
payments each year and more than 20 percent of S&P500 firms allow for this practice. 
The primary objectives of this study are to examine the market reaction to disclosures 
regarding DERs and to determine if DERs have the potential to induce firms to pay dividends or 
to pay higher dividends.  The incentives, either good or bad, are becoming increasingly important 
due to the emphasis on performance-based compensation.  A growing portion of stocks paid to 
executives are contingent upon performance, suggesting an increasing portion of unearned shares 
in executives’ compensation portfolios.  Starting in 2006, COMPUSTAT began reporting senior 
executives’ unearned share holdings.  The data show that the aggregate value of the unearned 
shares held by executives of all S&P500 firms is comparable to that of the restricted stocks.  Thus, 
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a study of DERs is an important contribution to understanding executive compensation, incentives, 
and corporate dividend policy. 
This study contributes to the literature in the following aspects: First, to our knowledge, 
this is the first empirical study on CEOs’ dividend equivalent income from their unearned equity 
awards.  The approach we take is also somewhat different from traditional studies.  We dispose of 
the groupings commonly used to categorize CEOs’ equity awards.  Instead,  to better capture the 
risks assumed by the awards, we classify shares as “earned” and “unearned.”   Second, we 
contribute to the literature on corporate disclosures by examining the question of how investors 
feel about this form of compensation.  Third, the study contributes to the discussion on firms’ 
dividend payout policies.  We show that in addition to the commonly acknowledged factors, 
dividend equivalents can influence a firm’s choice concerning dividend payout levels and make 
them rise to more appropriate levels, given their cash holdings and investment opportunities. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 reviews the literature, Section 1.3 
describes the test design and the sample, Section 1.4 discusses the main results, and Section 1.5 
discusses an endogeneity issue and provides robustness tests.  Section 1.6 presents summary and 
conclusions. 
1.2 Related Literature  
 There has been little research on DERs or DEs, but of course, considerable research on 
executive compensation and incentives.  The origin of that research is undoubtedly the classic 
Jensen and Meckling model (Jensen & Meckling 1976), which introduced the concept of agency 
costs as an economic consequence of the separation of ownership and management.  Optimal 
compensation contrasts reduce agency costs by aligning managerial interests with shareholders’ 
interests at minimal costs (Murphy 1999).   
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Executives’ equity-based compensation is found to be a natural solution in reducing agency 
costs – when a CEO becomes a large shareholder of the firm, his wealth is greatly dependent on 
the firm’s stock return performances, and thus he will have an incentive to take actions that 
increase firm value and consequently shareholders’ wealth the most.  The literature has 
documented examples of how properly arranged equity-based pay increases interest alignment.  
For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that stock ownership works best to provide 
managerial incentive to CEOs.  Matsunaga and Park’s (2001) results show that performance 
bonuses encourage managers to meet analyst earnings forecasts.   
Dividend equivalents could arise from optimal contracts if they can incent desirable 
activities such as increasing dividend payout, which may be the most relevant in this context.  
Empirical evidence has shown that the absence of dividend protection on executive stock options 
(i.e. no DERs granted with options) is associated with a decrease in corporate dividends (Lambert 
et al. 1989; Arnold & Gillenkirch 2005).  These findings are bolstered by explicit declarations by 
shareholders such as those by shareholders of Verizon who expressed concerns that a lack of 
dividend protection on options “may discourage executives from increasing dividends” (Verizon 
2003).  DERs granted with options and other equity-based awards may have a positive effect on 
firms’ dividend payout in many ways – encouraging dividend initiation, encouraging dividend 
increases, and discouraging dividend cuts. 
 The managerial power theory argues that the assumption that the board of directors acts in 
the best interests of shareholders is questionable.  Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that boards 
are not completely independent. CEOs have control over the process through which directors are 
elected or removed from the board, and thus directors are often not willing to take positions against 
CEOs.  Extant literature has documented a large set of examples showing that equity-based 
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compensation fails to reduce the agency problems.  Executive stock options may be the most 
extensively studied compensation tool, but they are not the only ones with flaws.  Equity-based 
compensation and its complicated terms may have assisted managerial rent seeking rather than 
preventing it: A study by Yermack (1997) shows that the timing of CEO stock option grants is 
opportune, because the grants are followed by favorable news announcements that cause abnormal 
positive returns.  Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that firms with fixed option award schedules 
tend to have abnormally low analyst earnings forecasts and stock returns prior to option award 
grants, indicating that managers delay good news and rush forward bad news before option award 
grants to maximize the value of their stock option compensation.  Callaghan, Saly and 
Subramaniam (2004) find that option re-pricing tends to follow bad news or lead good news.  
Brooks, Chance and Cline (2012) find that executives’ timing of the exercise of options is 
associated with the use of inside information.  Chance, Kumar and Todd’s work (2000) shows 
modest evidence that executive stock option re-pricing is abused by companies and often follows 
poor firm-specific performance not related to the market.   
The debate between the two schools of executive compensation theory may have aided the 
revolution of compensation package designs.  The decades from 1980-2000 features rapid growth 
in executive compensation as well as increasing attention to executive compensation from 
academics (Murphy 1999).  In 1993 the U.S. Congress passed the law to eliminate the tax-
deductibility of non-performance based executive compensation above $1 million (IRS 1993).1  
As a result, most companies began to substantially increase their use of options.  Stock options 
                                                   
1Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 was amended and passed into law in 1993.  It disallows a 
federal income tax deduction of public firms for executive compensation paid the CEO or any of the four most highly 
compensated executive officers in excess of $1 million in any taxable year.  The rule does not apply to the “qualified 
performance-based compensation”.  The “qualified performance-based compensation” and the related material terms 
such as performance goals have to be approved by stock holders (IRS 2014).  
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had an advantage over other performance-based compensations because they did not have to be 
expensed until they were exercised.  Thus granting options did not result in a hit on firm earnings.  
The attractiveness of stock options started to fade when the FASB passed the modified FAS123 
rule in December 2004 and required that they should be expensed as of the grant date (FASB 
2004).  Stock options continue to be used, but the expensing requirement has apparently shifted 
their used toward other performance-based equity compensation.   
Different types of equity-based awards and the variation in their vesting provisions provide 
a large family of compensation instruments for scholars to investigate.  Although many large U.S. 
firms pay dividends and their CEOs typically hold large amounts of firm equity, studies on CEOs’ 
dividend income are limited and results are mixed.  Zhang (2012) finds that dividend payments on 
CEOs’ unvested restricted stocks (referred to as dividend protection on unvested restricted stocks) 
can provide dividend incentives and the market reacts positively towards such news. In contrast, 
Minnick and Rosenthal’s (2010) study shows that firms that pay dividends on CEOs’ restricted 
stocks tend to have bad corporate governance.  Shareholders of those firms are at a loss since firms 
suffer from inferior operating performance following the payments.  Their evidence supports the 
managerial power theory that managers are able to influence their own compensation packages 
and extract rent (Bebchuk & Fried 2004).  Elsila (2013) documents a substitution effect between 
CEOs’ cash compensation and dividend income in that CEOs’ lack of dividend protection on their 
stock options tends to be offset by a premium in cash compensation.     
Although this paper also examines CEOs’ dividend income, it has two major characteristics 
that differentiate itself from other related studies.  For one, it focuses on a dividend-related 
executive compensation tool, dividend equivalent rights, whereas the existing literature studies 
dividend income in general.  Following the terminology that firms use in their annual proxy 
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statements, we refer to the benefit that gives the holder the right to receive dividend equivalents as 
a dividend equivalent right (DER), and the cash amount or stock, or share units equivalent in value 
to the dividend paid on a share of common stock as dividend equivalents (DEs). The key difference 
between common dividends and DEs is that the underlying shares of the former are real shares.  
They are registered, existing shares that are held by shareholders, some of whom could be 
executives. The shares underlying DEs are not technically real shares in that they have not been 
issued and in fact, may never be issued.     
The other characteristic that distinguishes this study from others is the way in which shares 
underlying equity awards are classified.  We do not use the traditional classifications to categorize 
underlying shares based on the standard names of equity-based awards such as restricted shares, 
performance shares, or options.  Instead, we categorize the shares covered by equity awards by 
whether CEOs need to perform to earn them.  According to this classification, shares are either 
earned or unearned.  Earned shares are subject only to time-based restrictions, that is, restrictions 
lapse over time as long as the award holder stays employed by the firm.  The majority of restricted 
stock or units belong to this category.  On the other hand, unearned shares are subject to 
performance-based restrictions, though they could also have time-based restrictions. 2   For 
example, newly granted performance shares and unvested performance-vested restricted stock or 
units are both classified as unearned shares.  Shares covered by executive stock options are also 
considered unearned shares, because no new shares are created prior to exercise and the shares are 
                                                   
2Technically all performance-based restrictions include time-based restrictions.  Performance goals are set for a period 
of time.  Thus, an executive might need to achieve a 10% increase in sales over the following fiscal year.  Except for 
the last instant before that fiscal year ends, the performance goal has a time restriction.  What we refer to as pure time 
restrictions, however, are merely related the passage of time and not to any performance goal.  More details about 
performance stocks are contained in Appendix A.  
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clearly earned only if the stock price is higher than the exercise price, which is clearly a 
performance criterion.   
The choice of classifying the equity awards in this paper has a great impact on the sample 
structure and the way the empirical results are interpreted.  The categorization is inspired by the 
observation that both parties – firms and shareholders – are concerned about CEOs’ rights 
associated with their unearned shares.  For example, we find that firms classify shares as either 
earned and unearned shares in their disclosures when explaining shareholders’ rights on the equity 
awards (Alcoa 2009; Fedex 2010; Mead Westvaco Coporation 2011).  An excellent example to 
address shareholders’ concerns over CEOs’ unearned shares is Shareowner Proposal No.5 in GE’s 
2005 proxy statement, in which the GE’s shareholders urged the firm to eliminate dividend 
equivalents on CEOs’ unearned shares (GE 2005).   
In practice the classification of earned and unearned shares has advantages over the 
traditional classification in at least two ways.  First, the classification of earned and unearned 
shares indicates the sensitivity of the value of the equity awards to performance and the extent to 
which the award is risky.  Differentiating the risks of equity awards is important because the spirit 
of using performance-based pay is to increase the sensitivity of executive compensation to firm 
performance – either the accounting performance, or the stock return performance, or both.3  At 
the time of grant, performance-based equity awards are supposed to be fully risky.  Managers have 
to pass certain performance hurdles to earn the awards.  Therefore unearned shares are much riskier 
than earned shares.  The traditional classification uses the terms “restricted stocks” or 
“performance stocks” to differentiate the underlying shares, but these terms provide little 
information regarding the risks assumed in those equity awards.  In fact, these terms may be 
                                                   
3The sensitivity of managerial wealth to firm performance is referred to as “Delta”, and the sensitivity of managerial 
wealth to stock price volatility is referred to as “Vega” (Johnson & Tian 2000). 
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misleading in indicating the level of risk.  For example, a share of restricted stock may be time-
vested or performance-vested.  The former is the traditional type, of which the vesting restrictions 
lapse over a few years.  The award holder enjoys all benefits as a shareholder except for the right 
to sell it.  The only risk factor assumed is that the award holder may leave the firm before the share 
vests.  Even in that case, the award holder may still be able to receive the partial or full value of 
the stock.  The latter type of restricted stock will vest only if certain performance goals are achieved 
and is, thus, much riskier.  A share of performance-vested restricted stock behaves similarly to a 
share of performance stock, whose holder faces considerable risk of not receiving the share if the 
preset objectives are not achieved.  The bookkeeping methods of the two types of restricted stocks 
are different.  A share of time-vested restricted stocks is a real share of stock and is kept in the 
award holder’s account after being granted while a share of performance-vested restricted stock is 
often granted in the form of units with no actual share created.  The share of stock covered by the 
units is issued when the award is earned.  The traditional means of classifying equity awards is 
unable to capture any of these differences.  
Second, the classification method used in this paper allows us to include more types of 
executive compensation tools in the sample, especially those that are widely used in firms but 
somewhat less discussed in the literature.  Performance stock or units, phantom stock or units, and 
restricted stock units are not as popular topics as executive stock options and restricted stocks.  
Data availability may have caused academia’s disregard of these types of awards.  Furthermore, 
these awards were not widely granted in the 1990s to the early 2000s when the rapid growth of 
executive stock option grants grasped the attention of academic researchers.  However, their use 
since that time has become more prevalent.  The ExecuComp database has begun reporting 
unearned performance stock data as of 2006.  According to the data, S&P500 firms are granting 
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performance stocks in comparable amounts with restricted stocks.  Moreover, the potential 
dividend income from CEOs’ performance stocks is comparable to that from CEOs’ restricted 
stocks.  The analysis of CEOs’ dividend income from equity-based awards will be biased if 
compensation tools such as performance stocks are excluded from the sample.     
Understanding the risks assumed in the equity awards is important in exploring the 
characteristics of CEOs’ dividend income.  If dividends are paid on CEOs’ earned shares such as 
most restricted stocks, firms could be using this policy to increase CEOs’ income with less public 
scrutiny, thereby making dividend rights be a form of stealth income.4  On the other hand, if 
dividends are paid on CEOs’ unearned shares, we will be concerned about the effectiveness of 
performance-based awards.  As mentioned in earlier discussion, the dividend income from 
unearned shares is not sensitive to performance and the disclosures of DEs are not as transparent 
as CEOs’ other income sources such as cash and stock options, with possible consequences 
including overestimating the values of the performance awards and underestimating the overall 
sensitivity of performance-based awards to firm/CEO performance.   
The strength of the link between our classification of earned and unearned shares to 
performance provides convenience in relating the results in this paper to studies on the 
effectiveness of performance-based compensation, which has become distinct from its close 
relative – equity-based pay.  Both performance-based compensation and non-performance based 
compensation have become new dimensions for categorizing executive compensation tools.  
Performance-based vesting provisions or conditions are embraced by both shareholders and policy 
makers alike.  Performance-based equity awards and compensation awards with performance-
based vesting provision account for an increasing portion of executive compensation (Deloitte 
                                                   
4Firms are required to disclose dividends paid on top-paying executives’ restricted stocks in the footnote of Summary 
Executive Compensation Table.  
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2005; Kanter & Frederic W. Cook & Co. 2005; Bettis et al. 2010).  In the early 2000s a growing 
number of firms adopted performance-based vesting provisions when granting stock option awards 
(Kanter & Frederic W. Cook & Co. 2005).  During the same time period, around the early 2000s, 
firms reduced conventional options because of the expensing issue of options.  Restricted stock or 
units grants were becoming the first choice of equity-based compensation among the U.S. public 
firms. Meanwhile, equity awards with performance-based vesting provisions such as performance-
vested stock options were also becoming popular (Deloitte 2005).  Efforts are exerted by the policy 
makers and institutions to promote performance-based compensation (IRS 1993).  The ISS 2007 
US Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary recommends that shareholders vote for proposals of using 
equity awards that are contingent on achievement of performance goals (FED 2010).   
1.3 Hypothesis Development and Data 
1.3.1 Hypothesis Development 
Dividend equivalents fit the managerial power theory in at least two aspects: First, the lack 
of transparency in DER disclosures is suspicious.  Second, although DEs are generally granted 
with firms’ long term incentive awards with performance hurdles, DEs usually are not 
performance-based.5  The joint effect of the two aspects is that DEs are paid to managers without 
shareholders’ recognition.  When shareholders do find about the DE payments, some have taken 
action.6  These actions would seem incomprehensible if such DER practices are beneficial to the 
firm.   
                                                   
5There are indeed some DERs that are performance-based.  They are not included in our sample. 
 
6GE’s 2006 proxy statement presented a few shareholders’ proposals that were submitted for a vote (GE) The 
proposals and board’s comments on Shareowner Proposal No.5 – Eliminate Dividend Equivalents – revealed two 
different opinions about DERs: The shareholders urged GE to stop paying DERs on senior executives’ unearned 
performance shares and unvested restricted shares. The reason, as indicated in the proposal, was that DER grants 
during the performance period went against the purpose of granting performance shares – aligning the interests of 
shareholders and executives and making compensation contingent on the achievement of firm’s performance 
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In keeping with conventional approach in scientific testing, we hypothesize that there is no 
reaction by shareholders upon learning of the existence of DERs: 
Hypothesis 1: There is no market reaction when firms disclose that DEs are granted on 
CEOs’ unearned shares. 
A positive market reaction suggests that shareholders recognize the benefits of DERs.  A 
negative market reaction suggests that shareholders view DERs as a significant cost with no net 
benefits.  Of course, no significant market reaction suggests that DERs are meaningless or there 
are no net benefits or net cost. 
Optimal contract theory argues that the board of directors negotiates on the shareholders’ 
behalf with managers and achieves agreement with management that can maximize the 
shareholders’ utility.  The managerial power theory argues that the agency problem also exists 
between the board of directors and the shareholders.  While some negotiation can take place, 
management is still able to influence its own pay arrangement and the final agreement is sub-
optimal for shareholders.  Therefore, it should be the case that CEO pay will be less sensitive to 
performance in firms in which managers are relatively more powerful.  This argument provides a 
clue to assess the value of DEs.  Intuitively, all else equal, CEO pay in DER firms is less sensitive 
to performance compared to CEO pay in non-DER firms.  Performance awards such as 
                                                   
objectives. The board of directors, however, believed the firm’s DER policy is beneficial and recommended that 
investors vote against the proposal.  
Shareowner Proposal No.5 was much of a shareholders’ response to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) (**Any 
citation must have a date) article “Extra Pay: Many CEOs Receive Dividends on ‘Phantom’ Stock”, which appeared 
on May 4th, 2006 ( “(2006)”). The article talked about the usage of DERs in a few well-known U.S. companies 
including GE. The information contained in the article stirred anxiety among investors of GE stock.  It was disclosed 
that the CEO of GE received more than $1 million dividend / dividend equivalents on unearned restricted shares and 
performance shares. 
An interesting finding in the board of GE’s comments to the Shareowner Proposal No.5 is that the board 
disclosed that starting from September of 2006, which was four months after the WSJ article appeared, the CEO of 
GE no longer receives DE payment on his performance share units, but accumulates DERs on these units. Meanwhile 
the board recommended that the shareholders vote against this proposal since the board believed that GE’s executive 
compensation package was effective. The fact that the WSJ article and the change in GE’s DER policy coincide seems 
to deliver a subtle message – GE’s DE payments on CEO’s unearned shares were considered inappropriate. 
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performance shares, performance-based stock options, and restricted stocks are supposed to be 
fully risky and dependent upon CEO performance.  Since the CEOs in the DER sample firms 
receive dividends on unearned performance awards, part of the value of their performance awards, 
the value of the DEs, is taken out and delivered to the CEOs at essentially no risk.  Therefore the 
value corresponding to DEs has become independent of performance, and the CEO pay in DER 
firms has become less sensitive to performance.  Therefore we hypothesize that DER grants are 
related to powerful CEOs. 
Hypothesis 2: DERs granted on unearned shares are associated with firms with relatively 
powerful CEOs and firms with relatively weak boards. 
We also construct hypotheses according to predictions of the optimal contracting theory 
that DEs have positive effect on firms’ dividend payout levels.  Although we take no position on 
whether dividends are inherently good or bad, it is widely acknowledged that companies that 
accumulate unproductive cash should be paying dividends or higher dividends.  Thus, DERs can 
be useful in inducing firms to disgorge unproductive cash. 
Hypothesis 3a: Firms that make or allow DE payments on CEOs unearned shares are more 
likely to pay dividends. 
Hypothesis 3b: Dividend-paying firms that also make or allow DE payments on CEOs 
unearned shares have higher dividend yields. 
1.3.2 Data 
To build the data base, we start with the S&P 500 firms from 1993 to 2012.  DER data are 
manually collected from the firms’ publicly available proxy statements.  To be included in the 
sample, the company must meet six basic criteria: (1) it must be an S&P 500 constituent for at 
least three fiscal years, (2) it must be covered by both the ExecuComp database and the 
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COMPUSTAT data base, (3) it must have at least five consecutive years’ proxy statements 
available in the EDGAR (SEC) database, (4) it must be a non-financial, non-utility, non-
communication and non-transportation company7, (5) the firm-year observation must not have a 
stock split or special dividend events, and (6) a firm’s policy regarding DE payments must be 
identifiable.   
The SEC began publishing proxy statements available beginning in 1994.  Because proxy 
statements are generally filed in anticipation of a vote at the annual meeting, most companies file 
proxy statements between January and March. For these firms, the executive compensation details 
provided in a proxy statement in a given year are for the previous year.  Therefore our sample 
period starts one year prior, 1993.  Information on the existence of DERs is manually collected 
from the publicly available proxy statements.  Table 1.1 summarizes the sample selection process.  
The final sample has 5442 firm-year observations, of which 3825 observations are firm-years that 
in which the companies have paid out common dividends.  
Table 1.1. Sample Selection Process 
 
Criteria 
Firm-year 
Observations 
ExecuComp S&P 500 firm-year observations with CEOANN=’CEO’  
and CUSIP identifiers 
8,426 
Less:  Financial (SIC code 6000-6999), utility communication and 
transportation companies (SIC code 4000-4999)  
1,203 
 7,223 
Less: Observations that either DER policies cannot be identified, no 
proxy statement is available or necessary values are missing 
1,713 
 5,510 
                                                   
7Here we use a company’s SIC code to identify its industry.  Financial companies have SIC codes between 6000 and 
6999.  Utility, communication and transportation companies have SIC codes between 4000 and 4999.   
Later in the analysis we use Fama and French 10-industry classification to create dummy variables for fixed 
effect regressions.  According to the Fama and French 10-industry classification, SIC codes above correspond to three 
categories: Telephone and Television Transmission, Utilities and Other (including Finance, Business Services, Mines, 
Construction, etc.).  Two categories-Telephone and Television Transmission, and Utilities are completed dropped 
from the sample.  The category “Other” is kept because firms in this category except for those Finance firms are 
included in the sample.  Thus in the regression analysis we have sample firms from eight industries. 
(Table 1.1 continued) 
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Criteria 
Firm-year 
Observations 
Less: Observations that have missing values or special dividends     68 
Firm-year observations included in the sample 5,442 
    
Firm-year observations in which common dividends are paid 3,825 
Firm-year observations in which common dividends are not paid 1,617 
  
For subsequent analysis, we use a number of financial variables that capture firms’ 
dividend policies, financial information and governance characteristics, and CEO characteristics 
and compensation.  These variables are described in Appendix B. 
Annual financial data are from the COMPUSTAT database.  The industry definitions are 
obtained from Professor Kenneth French’s web site. 8  We divide all firms into ten industries 
according to their four-digit SIC Codes.  We manually collect data from the firm’s financial 
statements (10-K, 10-Q, and DEF 14A) if there are missing values in the firms’ accounting 
variables.  Executive compensation data are from COMPUSTAT’s ExecuComp data base.  
Characteristics of boards of directors are from the RiskMetrics (ISS) dataset. 
The dividend equivalents data are hand collected from the companies’ proxy statements 
that are available on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) web site.9  We collect 
four types of information for each firm-year observation: the types of equity awards granted, the 
vesting conditions of the equity awards (performance-based, time-based, etc.), the performance 
period (if available)10, and methods of DE payment (cash, additional shares, etc.).  The types of 
awards granted include restricted stock or units, performance stock or units, stock options, etc.  
                                                   
8http://mb.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_48_ind_port.html 
 
9http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml 
 
10See Appendix A for more information about the performance period. 
 17 
 
The majority of the observations in the sample are DERs granted with performance stock or units 
and performance-vested restricted stock or units.  Vesting conditions are disclosed when awards 
are granted and when they are delivered.  The most important information we obtain from the 
vesting conditions is whether the awards vest contingent upon the achievement of any performance 
goals.  The performance period is a time interval during which the firm or CEOs’ performance is 
measured.  A typical performance-stock grant has a performance period of three to five years.  
Dividend equivalents can be paid out in cash or in additional shares or units of equivalent value 
with common dividends.  Payments of cash and additional shares can be paid when the dividends 
on the firm’s common shares are paid out or are accrued in a separate account under the equity 
award holders’ name.  When a firm grants performance-based awards, the firm may specify a 
minimum, target, and maximum number of shares to be earned.11  The amount of shares that are 
eventually earned by the CEO may be anywhere between a minimum and a maximum.  Cash DEs 
are typically paid on the target number of shares.  In cases where DEs are accrued on such awards, 
firms may allow DEs to be accrued on the target or the earned number of shares.12  We do not 
differentiate among the various situations in which dividend equivalents are paid.  As long as a 
                                                   
11For example, Marathon Oil Corporation ((Marathon 2003)) granted two performance share awards to the CEO in 
2003.  The performance periods were three years and two years.  The firm disclosed that “Vesting of these performance 
shares is based entirely on the achievement of pre-established performance measures related to corporate performance 
with payouts varying from 0% to 200% of target based on actual performance.”  Dividends were paid on the target 
number of performance shares.  See 
 http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/101778/000119312504036497/ddef14a.htm 
 
12An interesting question about the DEs accrued on performance-based awards is what happens to them if the 
underlying awards are not earned by the executives?  The disclosures about how firms treat the DEs accrued on the 
forfeited performance-based awards are very limited, especially before the late 2000s.  The limited information 
suggests different situations: if the DEs in the form of cash or shares are delivered to the executives before the 
underlying awards are forfeited, firms do not recoup those DEs.  If the DEs are accrued and kept in a separate account, 
they may be subject to the same performance conditions as the underlying awards, or they may be not.  In the former 
case the DEs will be forfeited when the underlying awards are forfeited, while in the latter case the DEs will still be 
delivered to the executives.  The disclosures suggest that the latter case was true to the majority of the firms in the 
1990s, while the former case has become more common after the late 2000s. 
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CEO is entitled to receive dividend equivalents, instantly or on a deferred basis, on shares that he 
or she has not yet earned we count those dividend equivalents as dividend equivalents on the 
CEO’s unearned shares.  To simplify, the phrase “DER policy” in this paper denotes only the 
existence of a firm’s policy that allows for DE payments on CEOs’ unearned shares.  Having such 
as policy does not mean that DEs are actually paid.  Therefore we distinguish between firms that 
have DER policies and the subset of those firms that actually make DE payments.   
The SEC web site is the most important source for us to obtain firms’ proxy statements.  
These proxy statements are filed with the SEC periodically and then mailed to the stockholders.  
In their proxy statements, firms disclose executive compensation and board compensation for the 
three most recent fiscal years.  The SEC does not require firms to disclose the value of DEs paid, 
but they do require that firms disclose whether DEs are paid on shares covered by long term 
incentive awards in the footnotes of the Summary Compensation Table.  We collect information 
from proxy statements and identify firms’ DER policies and DE payments in a retrospective 
manner.  
For example, a firm disclosed in its 1997 proxy statement that its long-term incentive plan 
that came into effect in 1990 allowed DE payments on executives’ unearned shares, and this 
disclosure is the earliest acknowledgement of the firms’ DER policy.  We then classified the firm 
as a DER-policy firm from 1993 to 1997.  After 1997 the firm will still be a DER-policy firm if 
no changes are made to its DER policy.  A firm is classified as a DER-payment firm in a particular 
fiscal year if any of its proxy statements indicate that a DE payment on the CEO’s unearned shares 
was made in that year.  Detailed executive compensation information such as the usage of DERs 
is usually not in the firm’s annual report or quarterly report.  The proxy statements are the main, 
if not only, source of information about DERs. Therefore, we assume that the market learns about 
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the DER usage information from the proxy statements, and the day on which the proxy statement 
is filed to SEC is the event day of DER disclosure.   
The quality of disclosure in firms’ proxy statements is less than ideal under certain 
circumstances.  For example, 
 Prior to 1994 when proxy statements were generally not available in the EDGAR 
database, 
 when a firm fails to disclose on-going DE payments since it is not required by the SEC, 
 during years in which dividends are not paid firms might not disclose their DER policy, 
and 
 when firms disclose that DEs are paid but omit details such as the instruments on which 
DEs are paid, the form of payment, size of payment, vesting conditions, etc. 
Table 1.2 summarizes the distribution of sample firms by time and industry.  Panel A and 
Panel B present the distribution of sample firms over the sample period from 1993 to 2012, which 
is referred to as the Full Sample.  Panel A summarizes the sample firms by time.  In a typical year 
there are 272 distinct firms in the sample, 22% of which allow for the payments of dividend 
equivalents on CEOs’ unearned equity awards.  Ten percent of the sample firms make payment of 
dividend equivalents on at least one type of the CEOs’ unearned equity awards.  Both the number 
of DER-policy firms and the percentage of DER-policy firms monotonically increase from 1993 
to 2007 and then drop slightly afterwards.  DER-payment firms show similar patterns.13  Panel B 
of Table 1.2 presents the distribution of sample firms across industries.  Using the Fama and French 
                                                   
13Note that the set of DER-policy firms is a larger set than the set of DER-payment firms.  If a firm’s proxy statements 
indicate that it allowed DE payments to be made on CEO’s unearned shares in year t or DE payments were made on 
the CEO’s unearned shares in year t, then it is classified as a DER-policy firm starting from year t.  The firm will still 
be a DER-policy firm in the following years until the firm announces a suspension of the policy.  A firm is classified 
as a DER-payment firm in year t if its disclosures indicate that DER-payments on CEO’s unearned shares were made 
in year t.  Thus, the sample of DER-payment firms is a subset of the set of DER-policy firms. 
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10-industry classification, the high-tech industry has the smallest portion of DER-policy firms and 
the shops industry has the smallest portion of DER-payment firms.  Panel C presents two sub 
samples – the Average Year Sample and the First Year Sample.  The two sub-samples are 
discussed in Section 1.4.5 in more details.  In short, the Average Year Sample selects one year that 
most closely represents the firm’s average year.  The First Year sample selects the first year the 
firm appeared in the overall sample.  There is no obvious pattern in the number of DER-policy 
firms and the percentage of DER-policy firms in the Average Year Sample.  The average 
percentage of DER-policy firm in the Average Year Sample is 29%, slightly higher than that of 
the full sample, while the percentage of DER-payment firms is much higher than that of the full 
sample.  The First Year Sample shows a similar pattern with the Average Year Sample. 
Table 1.2. Sample Characteristics 
 
Panel A. Full Sample, firm-year observations by time 
Fiscal 
Year 
# of Sample 
Firms 
# of DER-
policy firms 
% of DER-
policy firms 
# of DER-
payment firms 
% of DER-
payment firms 
1993 204 20 10% 12 6% 
1994 219 27 12% 15 7% 
1995 227 28 12% 16 7% 
1996 247 38 15% 19 8% 
1997 253 40 16% 19 8% 
1998 253 43 17% 20 8% 
1999 257 45 18% 20 8% 
2000 264 48 18% 21 8% 
2001 265 51 19% 24 9% 
2002 281 56 20% 23 8% 
2003 287 64 22% 25 9% 
2004 289 72 25% 29 10% 
2005 293 81 28% 35 12% 
2006 295 90 31% 39 13% 
2007 299 93 31% 39 13% 
2008 301 92 31% 40 13% 
2009 303 89 29% 41 14% 
2010 305 89 29% 41 13% 
2011 305 88 29% 42 14% 
2012 295 70 24% 27 9% 
Total 5,442 1,224 22% 547 10% 
(Table 1.2 Panel A continued) 
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Panel A. Full Sample, firm-year observations by time 
Fiscal 
Year 
# of Sample 
Firms 
# of DER-
policy firms 
% of DER-
policy firms 
# of DER-
payment firms 
% of DER-
payment firms 
Average 272.1 61 22% 27 10% 
Notes:  This panel summarizes the sample firms over the sample period from 1993 to 2012.  The columns 
contain the fiscal years, the number of firms that are included in the sample each year, the number of 
firms that have a policy allowing for dividend equivalent payments on their CEOs' unearned shares 
(DER-policy firms), the percentage of DER-policy firms each year, the number of firms that make actual 
dividend equivalent payments each year (DER-payment firms), and the percentage of DER-payment 
firms each year, respectively.      
 
Panel B. Full Sample, firm-year observation by industry 
Industry 
# of Sample 
Firms 
# of DER-
policy firms 
% of DER-
policy firms 
# of DER-
payment firms 
% of DER-
payment firms 
Non-Durables 51 19 37% 6 12% 
Durables 8 2 25% 3 38% 
Manufacture 96 35 36% 18 19% 
Energy 43 11 26% 4 9% 
High-Tech 92 21 23% 7 8% 
Shops 57 19 33% 4 7% 
Health 43 12 28% 5 12% 
Other 36 12 33% 6 17% 
Total 426 131 31% 53 12% 
Average 53.3 16.4 30% 6.6 15% 
Notes: This panel summarizes the sample firms across industries.  We use the Fama-French 10-industry 
classification and divide the entire sample into ten industries based on firms' SIC codes 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_10_ind_port.html).  We 
exclude financial (SIC code 6000-6999) companies in the sample selection process.  We also excluded 
utility, communication and transportation (SIC Code 4000-4999) companies.  According to the Fama and 
French 10-industry classification, those SIC codes correspond to three categories: Telephone and Television 
Transmission, Utilities and Other (including Finance, Business Services, Mines, Construction, etc.).  Two 
categories-Telephone and Television Transmission, and Utilities are completely dropped from the sample.  
The category “Other” is kept because firms in this category except for those Finance firms are included in 
the sample.  Thus eight industry categories are left in our sample. 
 
Panel C. Average Year Sample, firm-year observations by time 
Fiscal 
Year 
# of Sample 
Firms 
# of DER-
policy Firms 
% of DER-
policy Firms 
# of DER-
payment firms 
% of DER-
payment firms 
1993 13 3 23% 2 15% 
1994 22 3 14% 1 5% 
1995 25 2 8% 1 4% 
1996 16 4 25% 0 0% 
1997 20 5 25% 1 5% 
1998 12 1 8% 0 0% 
1999 12 2 17% 0 0% 
(Table 1.2 Panel C continued) 
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Panel C. Average Year Sample, firm-year observations by time 
Fiscal 
Year 
# of Sample 
Firms 
# of DER-
policy Firms 
% of DER-
policy Firms 
# of DER-
payment firms 
% of DER-
payment firms 
2000 18 5 28% 18 100% 
2001 24 5 21% 24 100% 
2002 17 2 12% 17 100% 
2003 21 6 29% 21 100% 
2004 35 10 29% 35 100% 
2005 26 12 46% 26 100% 
2006 28 9 32% 28 100% 
2007 27 9 33% 27 100% 
2008 10 4 40% 10 100% 
2009 25 11 44% 25 100% 
2010 23 15 65% 23 100% 
2011 24 12 50% 24 100% 
2012 22 9 41% 22 100% 
Average 21 6.45 29% 15.25 66% 
Notes: This panel summarizes the Average Year Sample.  The Average Year Sample contains data for a 
year chosen as each firm’s “average year.”  For example, if we find that a firm remains a DER-policy firm 
for more than two consecutive years, we then average the firm’s MEDecile (their decile of market value of 
equity) and V/A (market/book) over that period and choose the firm-year observation that has the closest 
values of these measures to the average values. This observation becomes the firm’s average-year 
observation in the DER-policy Average Year sample.  Similarly, if the firm stays in the non-DER policy 
firm sample for a few years, we choose its average-year observation in the Non-DER policy average year 
sample in a similar way.  The sample is summarized in the same fashion with Panel A.
 
Panel D. First Year Sample, firm-year observations by time 
Fiscal 
Year 
# of Sample 
Firms 
# of DER-
policy Firms 
% of DER-
policy Firms 
# of DER-
payment firms 
% of DER-
payment firms 
1993 204 20 10% 12 6% 
1994 23 10 43% 4 17% 
1995 10 3 30% 0 0% 
1996 31 11 35% 4 13% 
1997 11 4 36% 1 9% 
1998 5 4 80% 2 40% 
1999 8 2 25% 1 13% 
2000 11 3 27% 11 100% 
2001 8 5 63% 8 100% 
2002 14 7 50% 14 100% 
2003 11 8 73% 11 100% 
2004 10 8 80% 10 100% 
2005 14 9 64% 14 100% 
2006 15 12 80% 15 100% 
(Table 1.2 Panel D continued) 
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Panel D. First Year Sample, firm-year observations by time 
Fiscal 
Year 
# of Sample 
Firms 
# of DER-
policy Firms 
% of DER-
policy Firms 
# of DER-
payment firms 
% of DER-
payment firms 
2007 13 9 69% 13 100% 
2008 10 4 40% 10 100% 
2009 4 2 50% 4 100% 
2010 4 3 75% 4 100% 
2011 7 4 57% 7 100% 
2012 7 3 43% 7 100% 
Average 21 6.55 52% 7.6 70% 
Notes: This panel summarizes the First-Year Sample.  The First-Year Sample contains the observations in 
which firms become a DER-policy firm or a non-DER policy firm for the first time.  The sample is 
summarized in the same fashion with Panel A. 
 
Table 1.3 summarizes the basic descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study.  
Descriptions of the variables are in Appendix B.  It is shown in the table that on average a non-
DER policy firm pays out 1.77% of its total assets while a DER-policy firm pays out 2.34% and a 
DER-payment firm pays out 2.84%.  DER-policy and DER-payment firms tend to have larger total 
assets but their market cap is not different from others.  Non-DER policy firms tend to have higher 
percentage of CEO ownership of shares than DER-policy firms.  CEOs of DER-policy firms and 
DER-payment firms appear to have higher unearned performance stock holdings.   Further and 
more rigorous analyses of the differences in these samples will be provided in the following 
section. 
Table 1.3. Univariate Statistics 
 
 Non-DER policy  DER-policy  
Non-DER 
payment 
 DER-payment 
 Mean STD  Mean STD  Mean STD  Mean STD 
Payout measures: 
DIV/ASSETS 1.77 3.17  2.34 2.88  1.80 3.13  2.84 2.85 
DIV/OPERA
TING 
INCOME 
9.55 17.94  15.50 47.14  10.24 28.34  16.61 16.74 
DIV/EBIT 11.33 116.00  20.21 32.44  11.91 108.28  25.72 68.39 
DIV/NI 20.32 237.91  32.44 115.30  21.55 222.24  36.17 158.14 
(Table 1.3 continued) 
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 Non-DER policy  DER-policy  
Non-DER 
payment 
 DER-payment 
 Mean STD  Mean STD  Mean STD  Mean STD 
Dividend 
yield 
6.70 22.74  13.79 40.94  7.72 28.33  13.29 24.65 
Repurchase 
payout ratio 
4.04 8.72  4.45 7.08  4.19 8.64  3.70 5.52 
DIVDUM 0.68 0.47  0.84 0.37  0.69 0.46  0.97 0.17 
Accounting variables: 
A 
14,681.
73 
34,152.
34 
 
23,891.
62 
66,538.
28 
 
14,536.
99 
41,276.
14 
 
25,607.
03 
58,725.
37 
MEDecile 7.39 1.44   7.71 1.31   7.41 1.45   7.93 1.04 
V/A 2.50 2.44  2.36 1.69  2.53 2.39  1.96 0.91 
dA/A 0.10 0.20  0.07 0.16  0.09 0.20  0.06 0.14 
E/A 0.17 0.08  0.18 0.09  0.17 0.09  0.17 0.07 
FCF/A 0.11 0.09  0.12 0.09  0.11 0.10  0.12 0.08 
ROA 0.07 0.13  0.08 0.08  0.07 0.13  0.07 0.06 
LEV 0.06 0.25  0.08 0.21  0.06 0.25  0.11 0.19 
Market-to-
book Ratio 
2.46 2.31  2.34 1.63  2.48 2.28  2.00 0.96 
Corporate governance measures: 
E-index 2.43 1.38  2.65 1.48  2.47 1.39  2.59 1.48 
Interlock 0.03 0.19  0.04 0.18  0.03 0.18  0.04 0.21 
Dualrole 0.36 0.48  0.49 0.50  0.38 0.49  0.52 0.50 
Boardsize 10.19 2.47  10.93 2.18  10.26 2.44  11.27 2.06 
CEO characteristics and compensation: 
Tenure 7.31 6.68  6.68 5.61  7.20 6.57  6.92 5.37 
New CEO 0.11 0.32  0.12 0.32  0.12 0.32  0.10 0.30 
Totcomp 6.20 14.71  5.87 8.13  6.20 14.12  5.41 5.20 
Cashcomp 1.76 2.42  1.81 1.37  1.75 2.29  2.01 1.43 
Notes: Descriptions of the variables are in Appendix B.  
 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Determinants of DER Policy and DE Payments 
We use a logistic regression to examine the characteristics of firms that have DER policies 
and those that make DE payments.  All of our statistical evidence seems to suggest that firms’ 
DER policies and DE payments have strong bonds with the agency problems residing in the 
executive compensation design process.  The data shows that indeed DER policies and DE 
 25 
 
payments tend to exist in firms with powerful CEOs.  We use a Logistic regression to characterize 
firms that have DER-policies and DER-payments.  Policies regarding dividend equivalents and 
policies regarding dividend payout are naturally bonded:  DE payments on CEOs’ unearned shares 
may provide dividend incentives; meanwhile, high dividend yield firms tend to design and disclose 
policies regarding DE payments.  We use a dividend-payer sample to deal with this endogeneity 
problem.  By comparing the DER-policy firms and non-DER policy firms in the dividend payer 
sample, we determine the firm characteristics that are related to DER policies, conditioned on the 
fact that all firms are dividend payers.14   
 Larger firms tend to have more complicated compensation tools such as performance-based 
equity awards and dividend equivalents so we include an explanatory variable MEDecile to 
measure firm size.  Dividend equivalent rights are discussed in firms’ Long Term Incentive Plans 
(LTIP) and may be related to firms’ long term performance goals.  Therefore, we include variables 
commonly used in firm performance studies as explanatory variables.  Elsila (2013)’s study 
suggests that CEOs’ dividend income from unvested restricted stocks may substitute for CEOs’ 
cash compensation.  We also include CEOs’ cash compensation and total compensation to control 
for possible substitution effects between DE payments and cash compensation.  We use CEO 
tenure, the length of time that the person has been the CEO and a new CEO indicator to identify a 
recently appointed CEO.  CEO age was originally used to describe the CEO but was dropped 
because it co-varies with time fixed effects.   
The literature documents the crucial role of board structure in corporate governance.  We 
also include variables to capture this effect.  In 1992, the SEC increased disclosure requirements 
when insiders serve on compensation committees to encourage more independent director 
                                                   
14A related but interesting question is whether the potential for making DE payments could induce a firm to be a 
dividend payer when it otherwise would not.  Later we will address that question and account for the endogeneity. 
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involvement in the process of establishing executive compensation packages.  Researchers find 
little evidence showing that CEOs receive premium pay when insiders are members of the 
compensation committee (Anderson & Bizjak 2003) but the sensitivity of CEO compensation to 
firm performance favors CEOs when insiders are on the compensation committee.  We use the 
variable Interlock to indicate whether the CEO is also on the compensation committee.  Firms’ 
leadership structures as a dimension of corporate governance is also related to this issue.  Goyal 
and Park (2002) find that when the CEO and chairman duties are vested in the same individual it 
is more difficult to dismiss an ineffective CEO.  The variable Dualrole is used to indicate this 
characteristic.  Studies show that small boards are more effective in monitoring managers and can 
result in better corporate governance (Yermack 1996), so we include the variable board size as a 
corporate governance measure.   
The response variables in the logistic regressions are two dummy variables.  DER_POLICY 
indicates whether a firm has DER policy, and DER_PAYMENT indicate whether a firm makes 
actual DE payments.  The results are summarized in Table 1.4.   
DER-policy firms can be characterized as large, high dividend-yield firms.  There is some 
modest evidence that they pay CEOs relatively less than their peers and have powerful CEOs and 
weak boards.  DER-payment firms show similar characteristics.  The fitted coefficient of Interlock 
CEO is positive and significant at 10%, which means that when a CEO is on the compensation 
committee and is involved in the compensation decision making process, the firm has higher odds 
of being a DER-policy firm, or a DER-payment firm, at least to a modest level of significance.   
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Table 1.4. Regression Analysis of the Characteristics of DER-policy firms and DER-payment firms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
DER_PO
LICY 
 
DER_PA
YMENT 
 
DER_PO
LICY 
 
DER_PAY
MENT 
 
DER_PO
LICY 
 
DER_PAY
MENT   
Intercept -4.1709  -4.7534  -3.6715  -5.7330  3.4832  -4.8403  
MEDecile 0.1371 *** 0.2692 *** 0.1871 *** 0.3149 *** 0.1192 ** 0.2778 *** 
ROA -0.5362  1.6956  0.0083  0.8961  -0.6352  0.7169  
Leverage 0.3670  0.3392  0.4282  0.3981  0.2348  0.1192  
Market-to-
book   Ratio 
-0.0121  -0.3493 *** -0.0860 * -0.3155 *** -0.0837 ** -0.4291 *** 
Dividend yield 0.0230 * 0.0584 ** 0.0280 * 0.0570 ** 0.0563 ** 0.0981 *** 
Tenure -0.0104 ** 0.0050  -0.0149 * 0.0096  -0.0141 * 0.0102  
New CEO -0.0490  -0.1254  -0.0448  -0.1041  -0.0511  -0.0836  
Cashcomp 0.0038  -0.0210  -0.0201  -0.0315  -0.0110  -0.0319  
Totcomp -0.0000 * 0.0000  -0.0000 * -0.0000 * -0.0000 * -0.0000  
             
Interlock 0.2104 * 0.0015 *         
Dualrole     0.0449  0.2290 *     
Board Size         0.0353 * 0.0236  
             
Year Fixed 
Effect 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  
Industry Fixed 
Effect 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  
             
% Concordant 65.1  62.8  63.9  66  60.4  64.2  
              
*** (**) {*} significant at the 1% (5%) {10%} significance level for a two-tailed test. 
Notes: The response variable for regression (1), (3), and (5) is DER_POLICY.  The response variable for regression (2), (4), and (6) is 
DER_PAYMENT.  Variable definitions are in Appendix B.  The number of observations in all cases is 2,870.
 
 
CEOs’ preferences to receive dividends on their unearned shares may be explained by their 
risk-averse behavior.  Performance awards such as performance shares, performance-based stock 
options, and restricted stocks are supposed to be fully risky and dependent on CEO performance.  
When a CEO is allowed to receive dividends on his or her unearned performance awards, part of 
the performance awards’ value (the value of the DEs) is taken out and delivered to the CEOs at no 
risk.15  Therefore the value corresponding to DEs is independent of performance, and the overall 
sensitivity of CEO pay to performance decreases.  In extreme cases when the performance goals 
are very unlikely to be achieved and the performance-based awards are to be forfeited, the DERs 
on the shares covered by those awards will be quite comforting to the CEOs.  Consistent with the 
predictions of the managerial power theory, we find modest evidence that dividend equivalent 
payments on CEOs’ unearned shares and policies that allow such payments tend to exist in firms 
with weak corporate governance.  
1.4.2 Market Reaction Towards News of DER Policy and DE Payments 
In this section we examine how the stock market reacts to two types of first time disclosures 
about DER usage.  In the first type of disclosure, a company announces that it has been paying, is 
paying, or is planning to pay DEs on CEO’s unearned shares – positive disclosures.  This type of 
disclosure may or may not be followed by disclosures of actual DE payouts.  In the second type of 
disclosure, a company announces that it has never paid, no longer pays, or will not pay DEs on 
CEO’s unearned shares – whether associated with either existing awards or newly issued awards.  
The second type of disclosure is referred to as negative disclosures.  Negative disclosures can be 
preceded, or even be followed by actual DE payments.  For instance, assume a company paid DEs 
                                                   
15Even though many firms defer the payment of DEs instead of paying cash immediately, the DEs are still considered 
“safe” to CEOs.  They will receive them after a few years.  The risks involved in those DEs are not comparable to that 
of performance-based equity awards to which the DERs were originally attached. 
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in the years prior to 2006 and the company’s fiscal year end is December.  In the company’s 2006 
proxy statement, the company announced that it would not pay DEs on any unearned performance-
based stock awards that were granted in or after 2006.  This would be a negative disclosure.  
However, holders of awards that were granted prior to 2006 are still entitled to DEs.  Considering 
the fact that the most commonly seen performance period length is three years, it is possible that 
the firm still makes positive disclosures in year 2007 and 2008 for stock awards with DERs granted 
in 2005. 
The event dates are the filing dates of proxy statements. These dates are available on the 
SEC web site. The event period starts five days prior to the event date and lasts until one day after 
the event date.  We use the Fama and French three-factor model to estimate abnormal returns.  The 
sample has 93 positive disclosures and 179 negative disclosures. 
Results are summarized in Table 1.5.  We show that, on average, a first-time positive 
disclosure generates a significant and negative stock market reaction, while a first-time negative 
disclosure has a significant, positive market reaction at the 5% level.  The cumulative average 
return from day - 5 to day 1 is -0.70% for positive disclosures and 0.77% for negative disclosures.  
Overall the results indicate that the market does not favor positive disclosures and embraces 
negative disclosures.  Thus it appears that shareholders do not favor DERs. 
Table 1.5. Event Study Results 
 
Panel A    Initial disclosure of DER grants on unearned shares 
  Observations Mean CAR (day -5 to day +1)  
Fama-French Three Factor Model 93 -0.70% ** 
 
     
Panel B    Initial disclosure of no DER grants on unearned shares 
  Observations Mean CAR (day -5 to day +1)  
Fama-French Three Factor Model 179 0.77% ** 
*** (**) {*} significant at the 1% (5%) {10%} significance level for a two-tailed test. 
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1.4.3 Long-term Stock Performance 
In this section we study how the stock market reacts to the grant of DERs on CEOs’ 
unearned performance-based shares over the long term. We use Fama and French’s three-factor 
model (Fama & French 1993) and firms’ monthly returns to assess long-term stock performance. 
The sample we use in the OLS regressions is different from the event study sample. During the 
sample period from 1993 to 2011, there are 298 disclosures from 35 firms about actual DE 
payments on CEOs’ unearned shares.  We incorporate the Fama-French factors, as well as 
measures of corporate governance and an indicator for whether the firm is a dividend payer and 
whether the firm pays DEs.  We also use an indicator for whether the firm is in the S&P 500 in 
1993.   
The regression results are summarized in Table 1.6. The p-values are based on standard 
errors robust to heteroskedasticity.  The results show that on average firms that pay DEs to CEOs 
underperform the market by 0.53% each month. This result is very significant at levels below 
0.0001. 
The result is robust after controlling for variables that may be related to the firm’s DER 
usage. E-index is the Entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al. 2009), which is the number of key anti-
takeover provisions that firms adopt.  It purports to measure the quality of firms’ corporate 
governance. A dummy variable is used to indicate whether the firm is paying a dividend.  An 
indicator for firms that belong to the S&P 500 in both 1994 and 2011 is used to correct the survival 
bias in the sample since the sample firms consist of only S&P 500 firms.  E-index is not significant 
in the regression, but the dividend dummy and the 1994 S&P 500 firm dummy are significant in 
explaining the firm’s abnormal returns. After controlling for other effects, the indicator for DER-
paying firms is still significant.  The magnitudes of the coefficients vary slightly but are all 
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negative.  The long-term stock return regression results are consistent with the event study results.  
DER-paying firms underperform the market in the long term. 
Table 1.6. Regression Estimates of Stock Performance as a Function of Executives’ Dividend 
Income on Unearned Shares 
 
  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate   
Intercept 0.59 *** 0.62 *** 0.62 *** 1.36 *** 1.29 *** 
Market excess return 1.04 *** 1.04 *** 1.01 *** 1.04 *** 1.04 *** 
HML 0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.41 *** 0.37 *** 0.37 *** 
SMB 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.01  0.06 *** 0.06 *** 
           
E-index     -0.03      
DIVDUM       -0.99 ***   
SP500_93         -0.81 *** 
DER_PAYMENT   -0.53 *** -0.37 ** -0.3 ** -0.41 ** 
           
Adjusted R-square 0.1973  0.1974  0.1978  0.1989  0.1981  
            
*** (**) {*} significant at the 1% (5%) {10%} significance level for a two-tailed test. 
 
Notes: Ordinary least squares regression of sample companies’ annual stock returns. The sample includes 
S&P 500 firms between 1993 and 2011. The dependent variable is the raw monthly stock return minus the 
risk-free rate. The principal explanatory variable is an indicator for whether the company pays dividends 
on executives’ unearned shares (mainly unearned performance shares, unearned performance share units 
and shares covered by unexercised stock options). Other explanatory variables include the Fama and French 
factors: market excess return, HML, and SMB (Fama & French 1993). Explanatory variables also include 
the Bebchuck Entrenchment index, a dummy variable for firms that pay dividends, and a dummy variable 
for firms that were in the S&P500 in 1993.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
1.4.4 DER Policy and the Propensity to Pay 
We want to disentangle the association between firms’ DER policies and dividend payout 
policies.  DER policy can affect a firm’s dividend payout in many ways:  Consistent with the 
managerial power theory (Bebchuk & Fried 2003), managers can influence the board to adopt 
DER policies that can benefit themselves by increasing managers’ dividend income on shares they 
may or may not own.  The board can also adopt DER polices to compensate managers for losses 
in the value of their stock options or other equity award holdings when dividends are paid.   
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Because managerial compensation is insulated from losses due to dividends, managers to 
whom DERs are granted will not shy away from paying dividends.  According to this view, 
dividend equivalents may motivate CEOs to increase dividends rather than to invest in inferior 
projects.  This possibility is consistent with optimal contracting theory (Murphy 1999).  Both of 
the competing theories suggest that DER-policy firms and DER-payment firms are associated with 
higher dividend payouts than other firms.  We construct statistical tests to assess this argument in 
two ways.  First, we test whether DER-policy firms and DER-payment firms are more likely to be 
dividend payers.  Second, given that DER-policy firms and DER-payment firms are paying 
dividends, we examine whether they are more likely to pay higher dividends.   
We use logistic regression to examine how the existence of a DER policy is related to the 
likelihood that a firm pays dividends.  There is an obvious endogeneity problem.  Firms that make 
policies regarding dividends are most likely to be dividend payers.  The link between the DER 
policy and dividend payments is naturally strong.  The question we are interested in is: could it be 
that DER policies can make firms be dividend payer when they otherwise would not?  To answer 
that question we need to control for the factors that are associated with firms’ decisions to pay out 
dividends.   
The literature shows that dividend payers are characterized as large, profitable, lacking in 
sufficient investment opportunities, and having large free cash flows (Fama & French 2001).  
Following the literature, we include variables such as firms’ size, profitability, investment 
opportunity, and free cash flow to control for these characteristics.  We use the indicator 
DER_POLICY to measure whether a firm has a policy to pay DEs on the CEO’s unearned shares.  
We use a pooled logistic regression instead of year-by-year regressions since the pooled regression 
has higher power.  The regression equation is as follows: 
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𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑢𝑚) = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 +  𝛽0𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑌𝑗 + 𝜀 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑑𝑢𝑚 is a categorical variable indicating whether a firm pays a common dividend in a 
fiscal year with 1 indicating that the firm paid a dividend in a particular year and 0 that it did not.  
We fit the model on the probability of having “1” as the outcome.  𝐷𝐸𝑅_𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌 is the primary 
variable of interest. It is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the firm allows DE payments on 
CEO’s unearned shares and takes a value of 0 otherwise.  𝑋s are the control variables which 
include: MEDecile, V/A, dA/A, E/A, FCF/A, LEV, and ROA.  MEDecile is the NYSE firm size 
decile, that is, the largest decile of NYSE firms that have the same or smaller market capitalization.  
This measure is not affected by overall firm size growth over time and is thus more robust in 
capturing cross-firm size variation.  Firms’ investment opportunities are measured by the growth 
rate of firm assets 𝑑𝐴/𝐴 and the market-to-book ratio 𝑉/𝐴.  𝐹𝐶𝐹/𝐴  measures firms’ free cash 
flow.  It is operating income before taxes minus interest expense, scaled by total assets.  LEV is 
the firm’s financial leverage.  ROA is the firm’s return on assets.  𝑌s are dummies for industries, 
fiscal years and firms.  All observations are firm-year observations.  All variables are defined with 
details in Appendix B. 
Observations from the same industry are correlated.  This is also true for observations from 
the same fiscal year, or from the same firm.  For example, a firm may become a dividend payer 
because its competitors are all dividend payers – peer pressure exists inside the industry.  In the 
example, the industry-related effect clearly associates with the response variable – whether the 
firm is a dividend payer, it may also be associated with other variables that have impacts on the 
firm’s dividend policy.  Firm size for instance may be industry-related.  Some industries have high 
research and development costs such that large firms have a better chance of survival.  We need 
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to control for these unobserved effects residing in different industries, time periods and firms that 
may be correlated with the response variable or other explanatory variables.   
The unobserved effects that are controlled by using dummy variables, of which firm 
dummies are also used to address the lack of variation problem (i.e. multi-collinearity) that exists 
in the panel data.  It is widely known that firms’ dividends are smooth because firms are reluctant 
to actively modify their dividend policy.  Thus, the time variation in firms’ dividend payouts is 
limited.  This problem is more pronounced in the regression described here in which the response 
variable to describe firms’ dividend policy is an indicator.  Neither will the value of the response 
variable change as long as a firm remains a dividend payer or remains a non-dividend payer, nor 
will it reflect the changes in amount of dividends paid.  The key explanatory variable 
DER_POLICY suffers from a similar problem.  Once a firm discloses that it allows DEs to be paid 
on unearned shares, the value of the variable will not change unless the firm makes a change to its 
DER policies.  Lack of variation in variables may cause the statistical results to be unreliable – the 
significant effects shown in the regression results may be exaggerated due to similar data entries.  
We use fixed effects models, two subsamples, and mixed effect models to control for the 
unobserved effects and to deal with lack of variation problem.   
We have to decide whether the unobserved effects that reside in different industries, fiscal 
years, and firms are fixed or random.  There is an important difference between fixed effects and 
random effects: for fixed effects, data are collected from all the values/levels of the effect, while 
for random effects the values/levels are a random subset of the entire population of values/levels 
of the effect.  Industry is no doubt a fixed effect.  We classify all U.S. firms into a total of ten 
industries.  This is an experimental design process.  Two industries were excluded in the data 
collection step due to various reasons.  The eight industry categories left in the sample are all the 
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values/levels available for the industry effect.  They are not randomly selected from a population 
of industries.  Fiscal year effect and firm effect are more difficult to decide.  They have been treated 
as fixed effects in the literature.  But they can be treated as random effects too.  In fact they behave 
more like random effects.  We have data spanning twenty years which is a short period in the 
history of corporate firms.  The choice of the twenty years is due to the data availability.  It is not 
a result of any experimental design.  Thus the twenty years can be seen as a random selection of 
years from the history of corporate firms.  The firm effect is also more appropriately treated as a 
fixed effect than a random effect.  The sample firms are selected from the entire population of 
firms through a “random” selection process.16   
Table 1.7 summarizes the logistic regression results.  We first fit models that treat industry, 
fiscal year and firm as fixed effects.  The related models are referred to as “all fixed effect models.”  
We then fit models that consider industry and fiscal year as fixed effects and consider firm as a 
random effect.  At last we fit models that consider industry as a fixed effect and consider both 
fiscal year and firm as random effects.  The models that include both fixed effects and random 
effects are referred to as “mixed effect models”.  Panel A contains results of all fixed effect models.   
Panel B and Panel C summarize mixed effect models.   
Table 1.7. Results of Logistic Regressions to Determine the Effect of DER Policy on Whether a 
Firm Pays Dividends 
 
Panel A. All Fixed Effect Models 
  Firm Fixed 
Effects   
Average Year 
Sample   
First Year 
Sample   
Intercept 14.8083  -4.9563 ** 6.7413  
MEDecile 0.5623 *** 0.7389 *** 0.6589 *** 
V/A -0.3825 ** -0.6315 ** -0.5438 ** 
dA/A -0.8804  -3.2899 ** -5.4178 *** 
                                                   
16The sampling process is not purely random since we do have a few selection criteria such as S&P firms, Compustat 
database coverage, etc.  But the sample is supposed to be a good representative of the firm population.  This is 
consistent with the purpose of the random sampling process. 
(Table 1.7 Panel A continued) 
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  Firm Fixed 
Effects   
Average Year 
Sample   
First Year 
Sample   
E/A 2.9916  1.0123  1.6668  
FCF/A 2.6152  2.6992  2.0184  
LEV -2.968 *** 1.6673 ** 0.3677  
ROA -2.1328 * 8.1778 ** 7.8409  
       
DER_POLICY 1.3926 ** 0.8425 ** 1.0300 ** 
       
Fixed Effects:       
     Industry YES  YES  YES  
     Time YES  YES  YES  
     Firm YES  -  -  
       
Odds Ratio of DER_POLICY 4.025  2.322  2.801  
       
# of Observations 5,442  420  420  
% Concordant 99.2  88.9  94.2  
# of Pairs 6,185,025  37,539  38,475  
       
Hosmer and Lemeshow 
Goodness-of-Fit Test P-value 
<0.0001  0.5766  0.1666  
 
Panel B. Mixed Effect Models with Time Fixed Effects 
  IND Structure   AR(1) 
Structure 
  CS Structure   
Intercept -4.0052 *** 0.1184   -0.3326   
MEDecile 0.6090 *** 0.0836 *** 0.1403 ** 
V/A -0.3081 *** -0.0122 ** -0.0663 ** 
dA/A -2.4764 *** -0.1381 ** -0.2977 ** 
E/A -0.9627   -0.6106   -0.0983   
FCF/A 4.3819 ** 0.2654   0.4940   
LEV 1.0310 * -0.1398   -0.6869 ** 
ROA 3.3133 ** -0.0211   0.0054   
              
DER_POLICY 0.7691 ** 0.1274 * 0.2395 * 
              
Fixed Effects:        
     Industry YES   YES   YES   
     Time YES   YES   YES   
Random Effect:       
     Firm YES  YES  YES  
              
(Table 1.7 Panel B continued) 
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  IND Structure   AR(1) 
Structure 
  CS Structure   
Odds Ratio of DER_POLICY 2.1578   1.1359   1.2706   
              
# of Observation 5442   5442   5442   
              
QIC (the lower the better) 4789   5622   5709   
QICu (the lower the better) 4579   5499   5447   
              
Panel C. Mixed Effect Models with Time Random Effects 
  
ARMA(1,1) 
Structure   
AR(1) 
Structure   
TOEP(3) 
Structure   
VC 
Structure   
Intercept -0.3226   -0.3080   -2.1673 *** -4.1525 *** 
MEDecile 0.0812 *** 0.0822 *** 0.3580 *** 0.5842 *** 
V/A -0.0083   -0.0085   -0.1369 *** -0.2895 *** 
dA/A -0.1290 * -0.1440 ** -0.6776 *** -2.1348 *** 
E/A -0.3657   -0.5401   -1.0954 ** 0.3525   
FCF/A 0.1101   0.2266   1.5127 ** 3.3386 ** 
LEV -0.1433   -0.1148   0.5056 ** 1.1280 ** 
ROA -0.0015   0.0163   0.4542 ** 3.2030 ** 
                  
DER_POLICY 0.1544 ** 0.1454 * 0.5115 *** 0.6846 *** 
         
Fixed Effect:                 
     Industry  YES   YES   YES   YES   
Random Effects:         
     Time YES   YES   YES   YES   
     Firm YES   YES   YES   YES   
                  
Odds Ratio of 
DER_POLICY 1.1670   1.1565   1.6678   1.9830 
  
                  
-2 Res Log 
Pseudo-Likelihood 15430   15527   19672   31564 
  
Gener. Chi-Square 
/ DF 0.94   0.94   0.60   2.23 
  
                  
*** (**) {*} significant at the 1% (5%) {10%} significance level for a two-tailed test. 
Notes: DIVDUM indicates whether a firm pays dividend in a year.  Fiscal Years, Industry, and Firm Fixed 
Effects are dummies.  Details and descriptions of all other variables are in Appendix A.  Construction of 
the Average Year Sample was previously described in detail, but it generally reflects the firm observations 
from the most typical year.  The First Year Sample is constructed by choosing the first year observation 
when the firm starts to pay DEs, or when the firm stops paying DEs.  To be included in the full sample, the 
(Table 1.7 Panel C continued) 
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firm-year observations must have positive net income and positive earnings before interest and taxes.   The 
response variables are described in Appendix B.  
 
Panel A summarizes all fixed effect models in which industry, firm and fiscal year are all 
considered as fixed effects.  In the first column of Panel A, we control for the firm fixed effects by 
fitting each firm with its own intercepts.  The second and third columns summarize the regression 
results using the two subsamples which include only industry and fiscal year fixed effects.  The 
regression using subsamples does not include the firm effect.  The first column contains the fitted 
coefficients using the entire sample of 5,442 firm-year observations.  The indicator, 
DER_POLICY, is positively associated with dividend payout probability.  The effect is significant 
at the 5% level, implying a strong association between a firm’s DER policy and the likelihood of 
having a successful outcome (i.e. the firm pays dividend).  The odds ratio is 4.025, meaning that 
all other things equal, a DER-policy firm is four times more likely to be a dividend payer than a 
non-DER policy firm.  Larger firm are also more likely to be dividend payers while firms with 
more investment opportunities are less likely to be dividend payers (Fama & French 2001).  As 
expected, the fitted coefficient of firm size (MEDecile) is positive and significant, while the fitted 
coefficient of investment (V/A) is negative and significant.  The model has a concordant percentage 
of 99.2%, suggesting that it has strong power in predicting the outcomes.17   
The Average Year subsample contains 420 firm-year observations.  Each firm has at most 
two observations included in this sample.  The idea is to select one observation to represent a firm’s 
“average year” – the year in which the firm’ size and investment opportunities are the closest to 
its typical year.  For each firm, we first separate observations into two groups: one for the years 
                                                   
17We use SAS software to perform the logistic regression.  SAS reports the “percentage concordant” in the output by 
default.  SAS pairs all observations with different response variables.  In this case, that is all possible combinations of 
a DER-policy firm and a non-DER policy firm.  A pair is concordant if the observation with the larger predicted value 
also has the larger actual value.   
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during which its DER_POLICY takes a value of one and one for the years during which it 
DER_POLICY takes a value of zero.18  We then we calculate the average values of the variables 
MEDecile and V/A for both groups.19  From each group the observation in the year when the values 
of MEDecile and V/A are closest to the mean is chosen to be included in the Average Year sample.     
The other subsample, the First Year subsample, also contains 420 firm-year observations.  
For each firm, we chose the observation(s) from the first year that the variable DER_POLICY takes 
a value of one and the first year that the variable takes a value of zero.   
The results in the second and third columns show that the fitted coefficients of 
DER_POLICY are positive and significant at the 5% level, confirming that there is a positive 
association between the policy allowing for DE payments on unearned shares and the dividend 
payout probability.   
The estimated coefficients in the fixed effects model reflect within-firm variation while 
those in the two regressions using subsamples reflect cross-sectional variation; thus the estimated 
coefficients and their interpretations in the fixed effects model and the two subsample regressions 
are different.  In the fixed effects model the coefficients of leverage (LEV) and return on assets 
(ROA) are negative and significant, while in the subsamples the two coefficients are positive and 
significant.  For instance, the fixed effects model shows that both financial leverage and return on 
assets are negatively associated with dividend payout probability.  These results show how 
dividend policy is affected by changes in financial standing within a firm: according to the pecking 
                                                   
 
18Some firms have never made any changes to their DER policies over the entire sample period.  For these firms, only 
one observation will be chosen to be included in the Average Year sample.  For those who do change their policies, 
two observations will be chosen, with one from the years when the firms allow for DE payments and one from the 
years when the firms do not allow for DE payments.  
 
19This is true for the majority of the sample firms.  Thus at least two variables are needed to determine an “average 
year”.  When using MEDecile and dA/A to construct the sample, the results still hold. 
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order theory (Myers & Majluf 1984), when a firm’s internal cash reserve is exhausted the firm 
tends to choose debt financing over equity financing to fund projects.  Thus an increase in debt 
holding implies either a shortage of cash, upcoming investment opportunities, or both.  It is 
therefore reasonable for the firm to cut back its dividends.  An increase in ROA may suggest that 
the firm is in a stage of active investment and may result in fewer or no dividends.   The regressions 
using the Average Year sample shows that both financial leverage and return on assets are 
positively associated with dividend payout probability.  Those results are consistent with the cross-
sectional patterns that more profitable firms are more likely to payout dividends.  
We report the P-value of the Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test in Panel A.  
According to the P-values of the test, the model reported in the first column does not appear to be 
a very good fit, while the other two models fit the data quite well.  The poor goodness of fit problem 
in the all fixed effect model indicates that better models are needed to describe the variations in 
the data. 
Panel B summarizes results of a generalized linear mixed model with correlations between 
observations.  This model considers industry and fiscal year as fixed effects and consider firms as 
random blocks.  All observations of the same block are correlated and the standard errors of the 
explanatory variables are adjusted for this “within block” correlation.  We assume three different 
within subject covariance structures: independent structure (IND), auto regressive order 1 structure 
(AR(1)), and compound symmetry structure (CS).20  QIC and QICu statistics are measures of 
                                                   
20The correlation structures are represented in the matrix form: 
Independence structure (IND): 
[
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
] 
It has constant covariance. Between two different elements the correlation is zero. 
 Compound Symmetry structure (CS): 
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model fit.  For both statistics, a lower value means a better model fit.  The results show that the 
estimated coefficients of DER_POLICY are positive.  In the model that uses the independent 
structure (the IND model) the estimated coefficient of DER_POLICY is significant at 0.05, while 
in the models that use AR(1) structure and compound symmetry structure the estimated coefficient 
is significant at 0.10.  The estimated coefficients of the control variables vary across the models 
too.  The coefficients of the control variables in the AR(1) model and the ones in the CS model are 
consistent except that the leverage variable LEV’s coefficient is negatively significant at 0.05 in 
the CS model but it is not significant in the AR(1) model.  In the IND model the estimated 
coefficient of LEV is positive at 0.10.  From the AR(1) model and CS model to the IND model 
there are another two dramatic changes – the non-significant coefficients of free cash flow (FCF/A) 
and return on assets (ROA) become positive and significant at 0.05.  Both the QIC and QICu 
statistics are the lowest for the IND model which shows that it works the best in accounting for the 
variation in our data. 
Panel C of Table 1.7 summarizes the results of a generalized linear mixed model which 
treats industry as a fixed effect and treats both fiscal year and firm as random effects.  This model 
also considers firms as random blocks and allows observations of the same block to be correlated 
with each other.  We consider four correlation structures for this model: First-order autoregressive 
                                                   
[
1 𝜌 𝜌
𝜌 1 𝜌
𝜌 𝜌 1
] 
It has homogenous variances and homogenous correlations between elements. 
 Auto-regressive structure with order 1 (AR(1)): 
 
[
1 𝜌 𝜌2
𝜌 1 𝜌
𝜌2 𝜌 1
] 
It has homogenous variances.  The correlation between any two elements is 𝜌 for adjacent elements, 𝜌2 for elements 
that are separated by a third one, and so on.  The value of 𝜌 is between -1 and 1. 
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moving-average structure (ARMA(1,1)), first-order autoregressive structure (AR(1)), Toeplitz 
structure with three bands (TOEP(3)), and variance components structure (VC).21  We report the 
“-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood” statistics and the “Gener. Chi-Square / DF” statistics, both of 
which measure model fit.  For the former, a lower value means a better model fit.  It is used to 
compare different models that use the same sample.  For the latter, a value close to 1 means the 
variability in the data has been properly modeled and there is no residual over-dispersion.  All four 
sets of results show that the estimated coefficients of the variable DER_POLICY are positive.  In 
the ARMA(1,1) model the estimated coefficient is significant at 0.05, in the AR(1) model it is 
significant at 0.10, and in both the TOEP(3) model and the VC model it is significant at 0.0001.  
The estimated coefficients of the control variables are different across the four sets of results.  The 
ARMA(1,1) and AR(1) models share similar correlation structures and hence yield similar 
coefficient estimates and significant levels.  Both of them show that the estimated coefficient of 
the variable MEDecile is positive and is significant at 0.0001, and the estimated coefficient of the 
                                                   
21The correlation structures are represented in the matrix form: 
First order autoregressive moving-average structure (ARMA(1,1)): 
[
1 𝜑𝜌 𝜑𝜌2
𝜑𝜌 1 𝜑𝜌
𝜑𝜌2 𝜑𝜌 1
] 
It has homogenous variances.  The correlation between two elements is 𝜑𝜌 for adjacent elements,  𝜑𝜌2 for elements 
separated by a third, and so on.  The autoregressive parameter 𝜌 and the moving average parameter 𝜑 have values 
between -1 and 1. 
Toeplitz structure with three bands (TOEP(3)): 
[
1 𝜌1 𝜌2
𝜌1 1 𝜌1
𝜌2 𝜌1 1
] 
It has homogenous variances and heterogeneous correlations between elements.  Across pairs of adjacent elements 
the correlation between two adjacent elements are homogeneous. 
Variance component structure (VC): 
[
𝜎𝐴
2 0 0
𝜌 𝜎𝐵
2 0
0 0 𝜎𝐶
2
] 
It assumes the heterogeneous variance.  The correlation between two different elements is zero. 
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variable dA/A is negative.  Both of them have no over-dispersion in residuals and the ARMA(1,1) 
model has slightly better model fit.   
1.4.5 DE Payments and Firms’ Dividend Payout Ratios 
 In this section we examine whether a DER-policy firm that already pays dividends tends 
to pay higher dividends.  Using a subsample that contains all the firm-year observations in which 
common dividends are paid out, we show that the DER measure DER_PAYMENT is positively 
associated with dividend payout ratios.  We use four measures of dividend payout ratios: (1) 
common dividends over total assets; (2) common dividends over operating income; (3) common 
dividends over earnings before interests and taxes; (4) common dividends over net income.22  
Results are summarized in Table 1.8.   
Panel A summarizes the results of OLS regressions using 3,576 firm-year observations, all 
of which are dividend-paying observations.  In fact in our sample there are 3,825 dividend-paying 
observations, but 249 observations are dropped due to negative values of net income and earnings 
before interests and taxes.  Panel B summarizes the results using dividend-paying observations 
with those observations from 2007 and 2008 excluded.  The financial market underwent a 
structural change during 2007 and 2008.  Due to the financial crisis many firms suffered from 
liquidity shocks and cut dividends.  In order to address this issue, we drop the observations from 
those two years and rerun robustness tests. After 403 observations from those two years are 
removed there are 3,173 observations left.  Panel C summarizes the results using the Average Year 
subsample and Panel D summarizes the First Year subsample.   
 
 
                                                   
22We also tried the ratio of common dividends over stock price (i.e. dividend yield) to measure the dividend payout 
level.  The results show a positive association between the variable DER-payment and dividend yield which is 
consistent with the results tabulated in Table 1.8.  The dividend yield measure is very sensitive to changes in stock 
price and thus the related results are dropped from the table. 
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Table 1.8. Regressions of Dividend Payout Ratios on DER_PAYMENT 
 
Panel A. Full Sample 
  (1)               
DIV/ASSETS 
(2)   
DIV/OPERATING 
INCOME 
(3)    
DIV/EBIT 
(4)   
DIV/NI 
Intercept 0.3131  24.9629 ** -16.3929  46.5177  
MEDecile -0.0778  -1.0000 ** 5.7867 * -1.9631  
V/A -0.0913 ** -0.0836  -0.8763  2.9223  
dA/A -2.2374 *** -9.2471 *** -15.2068  -25.6409 ** 
E/A -0.9259  -117.3736 *** -142.9457  234.2169 ** 
FCF/A 3.6967 ** 10.9319  -19.9588  18.6542  
LEV 1.7369 *** 8.9213 *** 19.7892  -15.4646  
ROA 14.5100 *** 127.3851 *** 182.0294 ** -894.7231 *** 
         
DER_PAYMENT 0.2498 * 2.7407 ** 4.3419  -5.1802  
         
Time Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
Industry Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
Firm Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
         
R-square 0.594  0.438  0.103  0.253  
# of Obs. 3,576   3,576   3,576   3,576   
Panel B.  2007-2008 excluded 
  (1)              
DIV/ASSETS 
(2) 
DIV/OPERATING 
INCOME 
(3) 
DIV/EBIT 
(4) 
DIV/NI 
Intercept 0.5925  26.9612 ** -16.8325  47.2540  
MEDecile -0.0918 * -1.1467 ** 5.9430 * -1.7865  
V/A -0.0101  0.1795  -1.2830  4.4855 * 
dA/A -1.8610 *** -9.2758 *** -18.0525  -21.3913  
E/A -3.6923 *** -133.8110 *** -182.6396  278.2247 ** 
FCF/A 3.0836 ** 7.6265  -13.9914  -8.9971  
LEV 1.4068 *** 8.9755 ** 24.0716  -23.6127  
ROA 17.6734 *** 154.0566 *** 248.5842 ** -1,015.1286 *** 
         
DER_PAYMENT 0.2167 * 2.7355 ** 4.4579  -6.8009  
         
Time Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
Industry Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
Firm Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
         
R-square 0.625  0.410  0.115  0.214  
(Table 1.8 Panel B continued) 
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  (1)              
DIV/ASSETS 
(2) 
DIV/OPERATING 
INCOME 
(3) 
DIV/EBIT 
(4) 
DIV/NI 
# of Obs. 3,173   3,173   3,173   3,173   
Panel C.  Average Year Sample 
  (1)              
DIV/ASSETS 
(2) 
DIV/OPERATING 
INCOME 
(3) 
DIV/EBIT 
(4) 
DIV/NI 
Intercept -0.8751  29.4791 ** 80.4344 ** 91.0167 ** 
MEDecile 0.1561  -0.4151  -3.9565  -1.5906  
V/A 0.7207 ** 6.3556 ** 15.5302 ** 12.7463 ** 
dA/A -3.5010 ** -19.2108 ** -53.2085 * -66.3917 ** 
E/A -6.9204  -224.4051 *** 668.8276 *** 189.5135 ** 
FCF/A 5.3510  -68.7988 *** -329.1501 ** 49.6066  
LEV 2.1739 ** 24.0850 ** 89.4578 *** 26.0719 * 
ROA 31.0648 *** 397.0748 *** 1357.0191 *** -616.7027 *** 
         
DER_PAYMENT 0.4574  5.2971 ** 14.6121 * 4.3529  
         
Time Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
Industry Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
Firm Fixed Effects NO  NO  NO  NO  
         
R-square 0.601  0.429  0.423  0.304  
# of Obs. 266   266   266   266   
Panel D.  First Year Sample 
  (1)              
DIV/ASSETS 
(2)         
DIV/OPERATING 
INCOME 
(3) 
DIV/EBIT 
(4) 
DIV/NI 
Intercept 0.9428  37.3946 * 59.4846  176.4069  
MEDecile 0.0663  0.0920  0.6190  5.9704  
V/A -0.5582  0.1041  5.9123  3.1890  
dA/A -13.4995 *** -72.0780 *** -103.4831 ** -19.1852  
E/A 0.6635  -198.7298 ** -345.4167 ** 266.1726  
FCF/A 4.7469  5.9983  -59.5497  76.0215  
LEV 0.8257  15.7518  43.0288 * -47.5298  
ROA 46.7933 *** 368.5348 *** 507.0020 *** -706.0455  
         
DER_PAYMENT 1.1018  7.4384  12.4749  115.8653 ** 
         
Time Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
(Table 1.8 Panel D continued)  
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  (1)              
DIV/ASSETS 
(2)         
DIV/OPERATING 
INCOME 
(3) 
DIV/EBIT 
(4) 
DIV/NI 
Industry Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
Firm Fixed Effects NO  NO  NO  NO  
         
R-square 0.458  0.352  0.262  0.053  
# of Obs. 267   267   267   267   
*** (**) {*} significant at the 1% (5%) {10%} significance level for a two-tailed test. 
 
Notes: The regressions in Panel A use the full sample, the regressions in Panel B use the sample with 
observations from the year 2007 and 2008 excluded, the regressions in Panel C use the Average Year 
subsample, and the regressions in Panel D use the First Year subsample.  Construction of the Average Year 
Sample was previously described in detail, but it generally reflects the firm observations from the most 
typical years.  The First Year Sample is constructed by choosing the first year observation when the firm 
starts to pay DEs, or when the firm stops paying DEs.  To be included in the full sample, the firm-year 
observations must have positive net income and positive earnings before interests and taxes.   The response 
variables are described in Appendix B.  
 
For the four samples, the regression results are generally consistent.  As shown in Panel A, 
the estimated coefficients of the indicator DER_PAYMENT are positive and significant when 
DIV/ASSET and DIV/OPERATING INCOME are used as proxies for dividend payout ratios.  The 
estimated coefficient of DER_PAYMENT in regression (1) is positive, suggesting that firms that 
make DE payments on CEOs’ unearned shares have higher dividend payout ratios than firms that 
do not make DE payments.  The mean difference in dividend payout ratios is 0.2498 (percent).  
The mean estimated coefficient of the variable DIV/ASSETS is around three percent.  Considering 
this fact, the effect of DER_PAYMENT is also economically significant.  The results are robust 
when 2007 and 2008 observations are deleted (Panel B).  When using DIV/EBIT and DIV/NI as 
proxies for dividend payout ratios, the variable DER_PAYMENT is insignificant.  This is true for 
the results in both Panel A and Panel B.    
The regressions using the Average Year sample show that DER_PAYMENT has a positive 
and significant effect on dividend payout ratios when DIV/OPERATING INCOME and DIV/EBIT 
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are used as proxies; however, the effect is not significant when using the measures DIV/ASSETS 
and DIV/NI.  Regressions using the First Year sample show that the effect of DER_PAYMENT is 
positive and significant only when DIV/NI is used as the measure of dividend payout ratio.  The 
First Year sample suffers from a selection bias because the majority of the sample comes from the 
year 1993.  Thus the results may not be as reliable as the ones derived from the other three samples.  
Overall the results are consistent with the argument that firms that pay dividend equivalents to 
CEOs on their unearned shares tend to pay higher dividends. 
 The alternative way in which firms return cash to shareholders is through repurchases.  We 
use total repurchase expenses divided by total assets to measure repurchases.  While the variable 
DER_PAYMENT has a strongly positive effect on firms’ dividend payout ratios, its impact on 
firms’ repurchase payout is minimal.  As shown in Table 1.9, the variable DER_PAYMENT has 
no significant effect on repurchase payout ratios.   
Table 1.9. Impact of DE Payments on Repurchases 
 
  Full Sample 2007-2008 
Excluded 
Average Year 
Sample 
First Year 
Sample 
Intercept 5.9092  6.7516 ** -3.1383  -0.3441  
MEDecile -0.4176 ** -0.3122 ** -0.2692  -0.4473  
V/A 1.0901 *** 0.8261 *** -0.5919  0.0953  
dA/A -12.5728 *** 0.2281 *** -14.139 *** -8.3036 ** 
E/A 9.4699 ** 7.4222 ** 27.0064 ** 38.4909 *** 
FCF/A 2.9350  4.7405  17.0502 ** 9.2428  
LEV 14.2301 *** 3.1006 ** 4.8423 ** 4.5227 ** 
ROA 22.0115 *** 10.7849 *** 31.7336 ** 2.8467  
         
DER_PAYMENT 0.0636  0.1019  0.6133  0.6993  
         
Time Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  -  -  
         
R-Square 0.451  0.511  0.507  0.483  
(Table 1.9 continued)  
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  Full Sample 2007-2008 
Excluded 
Average Year 
Sample 
First Year 
Sample 
# of Obs. 3,825   3,393   283   269   
*** (**) {*} significant at the 1% (5%) {10%} significance level for a two-tailed test. 
Notes: The regressions in this table use the full sample, the sample with observations from the year 2007 
and 2008 excluded, the Average Year subsample, and the First Year subsample.  The response variable is 
the repurchase payout ratio measured by repurchase expenses divided by total assets.  Variable descriptions 
are in Appendix B. 
 
1.5 Endogeneity Issues between Dividend Policies and DER Policies  
In Section 1.4 we reported that firms that allow for dividend equivalent payments on their 
CEOs’ unearned shares are more likely to be dividend payers and that firms that pay out dividend 
equivalents on their CEOs’ unearned shares tend to pay higher dividends.  The results jointly 
indicate that the policy to pay dividend equivalent on CEOs’ unearned shares is positively 
associated with dividend payouts.  The causal relationship, however, is difficult to prove because 
both the dividend policies and the policies regarding dividend equivalent rights are firms’ 
endogenous choices.  The strong association between the two can be explained in multiple ways.  
First, the dividend equivalent right policies lead to changes in dividend policies; for instance, the 
extra dividend income on unearned shares can encourage a CEO to push to increase dividends.  
Another possibility is that the dividend policies lead to changes in the dividend equivalent right 
polices.  For instance, if a firm is currently paying dividends, it is more likely to make policies 
related to dividends such as a policy to allow executives to receive dividends on their unearned 
shares.  Lastly, some unobserved events can lead to changes in both kinds of policies so that both 
policies are strongly correlated but no causal relationship exists between the two.  To disentangle 
this endogeneity problem we use three approaches: the lagged variable approach, the matched-
sample approach and the exogenous shock approach.      
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1.5.1 Lagged Variable Approach 
 Time order is an important criterion for causal relationships.  If two events are strongly 
associated, the event that takes place at an earlier time is more likely to be the cause, and the event 
that takes places at a later time is more likely to be the result.  In this spirit we use lagged values 
of the variable DER_POLICY and rerun the tests described in Section 1.4.4.  The effect of a 
dividend equivalent policy that was established at earlier years on the current year dividend policy 
can provide support to the argument that the dividend equivalent policy can lead to changes in a 
firm’s dividend policy.  The results are summarized in Table 1.10. 
Table 1.10. Lagged Value Approach 
 
  DIVDUM DIVDUM DIVDUM DIVDUM 
Intercept 14.8083  -3.9420 ** -3.8664 ** -2.7981 ** 
MEDecile 0.5623 *** 0.5849 *** 0.5633 *** 0.4524 ** 
V/A -0.3825 ** -0.3618 ** -0.3233 ** -0.2459 ** 
dA/A -0.8804  -0.4057  -0.7114  -0.4938  
E/A 2.9916  4.6488 * 5.2913 * 2.8853  
FCF/A 2.6152  1.0926  0.4396  1.6413  
LEV -2.968 *** -3.7375 *** -3.5220 *** -2.7943 ** 
ROA -2.1328 * -4.1274 ** -3.8432 ** -3.5494 ** 
         
DER_POLICY 1.3926 **       
One year lag DER_POLICY   1.5696 ***     
Two year lag DER_POLICY     1.6347 **   
Three year lag DER_POLICY       0.8326 * 
         
Time Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
Industry Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
Firm Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
         
Odds Ratio of DER_POLICY 4.025  10.472  11.975  5.353  
         
# of Observation 5,442  5,135  4,826  4,524  
% Concordant 99.2  99.3  99.3  99.3  
# of Pairs 6,185,025  5,465,274  4,786,122  4,169,915  
*** (**) {*} significant at the 1% (5%) {10%} significance level for a two-tailed test. 
 
(Table 1.10 continued) 
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Notes: The response variable is DIVDUM.  It indicates whether a firm pays dividend in a year.  The key 
variables are DER_POLICY, one year lag DER_POLICY, two year lag DER_POLICY and three year lag 
DER_POLICY.  Other variables are described in Appendix B. 
 
The results in the Table 1.10 show that a DER policy can affect a firm’s dividend-paying 
likelihood for up to three years.  The one-year lagged DER_POLICY and the two-year lagged 
DER_PAYMENT have positive and significant effects on the probability for a firm to be a dividend 
payer.  The effects are significant at the 5% level.  The three-year lagged DER_PAYMENT also 
has a positive effect with a significance level of 10%.   
1.5.2 Matched Sample Approach 
In order to disentangle the possible confounding effects of DER-policy and a high 
likelihood of paying dividends, we use a matched-sample approach.  Suppose we have two firms 
whose characteristics suggest that they are equally likely to be dividend payers or non-dividend 
payers, but neither firm is currently paying a common dividend.  In other words, the two firms are 
similar in the dimensions commonly associated with dividend policy.  One of the firms then 
initiates a DER policy and the other does not.  The two firms thus start to diverge on only one 
dimension, DER policy.  If at a later date, their dividend policies also become different from each 
other, this change is likely due to the only difference between them, their DER policies.  In this 
spirit we form a matched sample as described below. 
We first form a pool of treatment firms, which are essentially firms that initiate a DER 
policy and meet other specifications.  A treatment firm has to meet the following criteria: (1) in 
year t, the firm does not pay dividends but it initiates a policy allowing for DE payments on its 
CEO’s unearned shares.  The year t is then the DER policy initiation year for the treatment firm.   
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It can be any year between 1994 and 2010.23  (2) the firm keeps its DER policy in the year t+1 and 
the year t+2 so that the policy is persistent for at least three years, (3) the firm has no special events 
like a stock split or special dividends during the entire sample period from 1993 to 2012, (4) the 
firm is not a recurring dividend payer.  Recurring dividends are cases where otherwise dividend-
paying firms omit dividends but then resume paying them, which can be due to any of a number 
of reasons.  We have 25 treatment firms and 476 corresponding firm-year observations.   
We then choose control firms for each treatment firm in the treatment firm’s policy 
initiation year t.  The criteria used to select a control firm are: (1) in year t, the firm does not pay 
dividends and does not allow for DE payments on its CEO’s unearned shares, (2) the firm does 
not allow for DE payments on its CEO’s unearned shares in the year t+1 and the year t+2, (3) the 
firm has no special events like a stock split or special dividends during the entire sample period 
from 1993 to 2012, (4) the firm is not a recurring dividend payer, (5) the firm has a dividend 
propensity score greater than that of the treatment firm and the difference between the two firms’ 
scores is less or equal to 0.05. 24   The propensity scores are the fitted dividend payout 
probabilities.25 
We are able to find qualified control firms for 24 out of the 25 treatment firms.  Thus we 
have 24 one-to-n matched groups, with each group containing one treatment firm and n ≥ 1 control 
firms.  The average value of n is 20.  Within each group, the treatment firm and the n control firms 
                                                   
23Note this is not the sample period used in the rest of the paper.  The sample period starts in 1993.  For many firms, 
the year 1993 is the first year for them to have DER policies.  If those firms are included they will dominant the 
treatment firms.  Thus the year 1993 is excluded in this step.  The years 2011 and 2012 are excluded because we 
require at least two years after the DER policy initiation years to identify dividend policy changes.    
24This requirement is related to the second explanation of the different patterns in deviations.  If a treatment firm has 
a higher fitted dividend probability than its control firm, then any difference in the deviation we observe can be 
attributed to the effect of the treatment and the effect of the fitted dividend probability.  The requirement can facilitate 
the separation of the effects. 
 
25The regression equation is: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀) = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑗 + 𝜀 
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have approximately the same likelihood of being a dividend payer (or non-dividend payer).  The 
treatment firm becomes a DER policy holder in a certain year during the sample period while the 
control firms remain non-policy holders.  We first take the treatment firm’s DER policy initiation 
year as the time of origin.  We then observe and compare how the dividend policies of the treatment 
firm and those of the control firms change in the following years.  Because the 24 treatment firms 
initiated their DER policy in different years, this comparison is not affected by the economic cycles 
or other time-related macro-economic factors.  The dividend payout propensity scores capture the 
factors that contribute to firms’ dividend policy decisions except for their DER policies.  Because 
we use the propensity scores to match the treatment firm and matched firms, the only difference 
between the treatment firm and the control firms is that the treatment firm has a DER policy while 
the control firms do not.  The patterns shown in firms’ dividend policy changes after the DER 
policy initiation year thus are likely to be driven by DER policy only. 
We summarize the results of the 24 matched groups in Figure 1.1.  Plot A (Propensity 
Scores”) shows the changes in the average propensity scores before and after the time of matching.  
On the horizontal axis are the years relative to the treatment firms’ DER policy initiation years, 
where year 0 is the time of the DER policy initiation.  It is shown that, by design, the average 
propensity scores of the control firms are slightly higher than those of the treatment firms from 
year -2 to year 0.  After the policy initiation year, the two curves stay close to each other and are 
almost parallel over time, indicating that the treatment firms (the DER-policy firms) and control 
firms (the Non-DER policy firms) continue to share a similar likelihood of being a dividend payer 
after the treatment firms’ DER policy initiation year.   
Plot B (“Deviations”) shows the changes in the treatment firms and control firms’ dividend 
policies.  The regression results from Section 1.4.4 show that the average propensity score of all 
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sample firms is 0.7.  This means that a firm with a propensity score greater than 0.7 is more likely 
to be a dividend payer than an average sample firm.  We then define this firm as an expected 
dividend payer.  If the firm indeed is a dividend payer then the deviation between the expectation 
and the reality is 0.  Otherwise the deviation is -1.  Similarly, if a firm’s propensity score is below 
0.7 it is expected not to be a dividend payer.  If the firm indeed is not a dividend payer then the 
deviation is 0.  Otherwise the deviation is +1.26  We then calculate the group average deviation 
value for the treatment firms and control firms, and plot the average deviation against time.  It is 
shown that at the time when the treatment firms and control firms are matched up, the average 
deviation values for both groups are below zero.27  The average deviation of the treatment firms 
increases over time but the mean deviation for the control firms is fairly stable at around -0.5.  
Seven years after matching up, the gap between the two means is as wide as 0.3.  At that time most 
of the treatment firms have initiated dividends, but their control firms remain non-payers.28   
                                                   
26The deviation values can be summarized in the table below: 
 Expected dividend payer Expected non-dividend payer 
Actual dividend payer 0 1 
Actual non-dividend payer -1 0 
 
27A treatment firm and its control firms are all non-dividend payers when they are matched up.  But they may be 
expected payers.  For those that are non-dividend payers but are expected to pay dividends, the deviation values are -1.  
For those that are non-dividend payers and are expected to be non-payers, the deviation values are 0.  Thus, when the 
two types of firms are pooled, the average deviation is below 0. 
 
28The left ends of the two lines on the Deviations plot are close to zero.  This is because most treatment firms and 
control firms have fitted dividend payout probabilities below 0.7.  They were predicted to be non-payers and were 
indeed not paying dividends.  The mean deviation is thus close to zero. 
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Figure 1.1. Comparison of Mean Deviations of Fitted Dividend Payout Probability-Matched 
Samples 
Plot A. Propensity Scores.  On the horizontal axis is the number of years before or after the DER policy 
initiation year for the treatment firms.  On the vertical axis are the average propensity scores for the DER-
policy firms and non-DER policy firms.  
 
Plot B. Deviations. 
On the horizontal axis are the numbers of years before or after the DER policy initiation year for the 
treatment firms.  On the vertical axis are the average deviation for the DER-policy firms and non-DER 
policy firms. 
 
The trend of the mean deviations and the fitted probabilities provide some insights about 
the mechanism of firms’ dividend payout policies and their DER policies.  At the time when a 
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treatment firm and its control firms are paired up, the control firms have the same estimated 
propensity to pay dividends, if not higher.  As time goes by, however, the treatment firm tends to 
become a dividend payer while its control firm tends to remain a non-payer.  This evidence 
supports the notion that DER policy does provide an incentive for expected dividend payers to 
become actual dividend payers.  This result does not, however, rule out the possibility that the 
CEO anticipates the future dividend payout and influences the board to make self-serving DER 
policies in the future.  It is likely that an insider like the CEO who holds sufficient proprietary 
information has a very good expectation of any upcoming dividend initiation. 
1.5.3 2003 Dividend Tax Reform as an Exogenous Shock 
On May 23th, 2003, the U. S. Congress passed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003.  The act was signed into law a few days later on May 28 th, 2003.  The 
act contains tax cuts that President George W. Bush proposed, including reducing the top marginal 
dividend tax rate from 38.6% to 15% (Brown et al. 2003).  In the US, a firm’s earnings are first 
taxed at the corporate tax rate.  Then, when a portion of earnings is distributed to shareholders in 
the form of dividends, the shareholders also have to pay taxes at their personal tax rates, leading 
to the well-known problem of “double taxation” of dividends.  President Bush proposed 
elimination of the dividend tax, for it is “not fair to double-tax by taxing the shareholder on the 
same profits” (The White House 2003).  Although the 2003 dividend tax cut did not put an end to 
double taxation, it effectively reduced the top marginal dividend tax rate from 38.6 percent to 15 
percent.   
 The large dividend tax rate reduction enacted in 2003 greatly influenced corporate payout 
policies among U.S. firms.  Companies whose executives had high ownership increased dividends, 
suggesting a relationship between executive holdings and payout policy (Brown et al. 2003).  
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Chetty and Saez’s findings show that more firms initiated regular dividend payouts, dividend-
paying firms increased their regular dividend payouts, and special dividends increased as well 
(Chetty & Saez 2005).  Their findings also show that responses to the tax cut were strongest in 
firms in which executives had high share holdings and low options holdings and in firms whose 
shareholders had strong preferences for dividends.  
 The 2003 tax cut provides a unique laboratory to disentangle the endogeneity between 
dividend policy and policies regarding DERs.  The 2003 dividend tax cut as an external shock is 
unlikely to be anticipated by firms, therefore we would not expect firms to modify their dividend 
policies in 2002 in anticipation of the tax cut in 2003.  Other corporate polices such as the ones 
regarding DERs are not likely to be affected, at least not in the short run.   
Let us start by distinguishing between a firm’s optimal payout level and its payout policy.  
The optimal payout level is determined by the firm’s cash flow in relation to its investment 
opportunities.  Its dividend policy, however, may be to pay higher or lower dividends than the 
optimum, resulting from a clientele effect.  Thus, its dividend policy will reflect the needs of its 
investors.  A tightly held firm with many shareholders in high tax brackets will tend to pay 
relatively low dividends.  A firm held by many pension plans is likely to pay relatively high 
dividends.  Tax rates are clearly a factor in the shareholders’ desire for dividends.  And from our 
previously reported results, the existence of a DER policy can motivate a firm to pay dividends or 
higher dividends. 
A reduction in individual dividend tax rates should not affect a firm’s investment 
opportunities or fundamentals.29  Therefore the tax cut should not change the optimal dividend 
payout level of the firm, but it can affect the firm’s dividend policy because the Board of Directors 
                                                   
29A change in the corporate tax rate, however, will affect firms’ fundamentals.  During the 2003 dividend tax cut 
period, no policy regarding corporate tax rates was made. 
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is under pressure from shareholders who benefit from the dividend tax cut and either now want 
dividends or want higher dividends.  The Board’s decision on whether to keep the current dividend 
policy depends on whether the firm has achieved the optimal dividend payout level.  The Board is 
presumably aware of the best dividend policy for the firm since it possesses the necessary 
information.  If the Board has been effectively incentivized to pay dividends at the optimal level 
then it will stay with the current dividend policy.  But if the incentives are not strong enough, it is 
likely that the firm’s dividend payouts are below the optimum.  Thus, pressure from the 
shareholders may provide the incentive to initiate dividends or to increase dividends if they are 
already being paid.  We hypothesize that the existence of DER policies can effectively establish a 
firm’s dividend policy such that personal tax cuts on dividend income provide an insufficient 
incentive to initiate or increase dividends.  Conversely, firms without DER policies are more likely 
to initiate or increase dividends. 
Following other researchers (Zhang 2012), we use a difference-in-difference approach to 
show how a firm’s response toward the 2003 dividend tax cut is influenced by its DER practices.  
A firm’s response is measured by the changes in its dividend policies around the dividend tax cut, 
such as an initiation of regular dividend payouts.  The effect of DER practices can be shown by 
comparing and contrasting firms’ responses between DER-payment firms and non-DER payment 
firms, and between DER-policy firms and non-DER policy firms. 
 The empirical tests are carried out as follows.  The sample includes 320 firms that have no 
missing values over the sample period of 2002-2004.30  The dividend tax cut was signed into law 
in 2003, thus the year 2002 is taken as the “pre-tax cut year” and 2004 is the “post-tax cut year”.  
Each firm is independently classified three times: by the values changes in its DER-payment 
                                                   
30We require that firms have no missing values for the variables DIVDUM, DERolicy, and DER_payment.  The 
sample firms should be covered by COMPUSTAT database.  
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indicator, by the value changes in its DER-policy indicator and by its dividend payment indicator.  
Each classification process puts a firm into one of four sub-categories.  For example, for each 
sample firm the indicator DER-payment takes a value of 0 or 1 in any given year.  Since only 2002 
and 2004 are of interest, there are four combinations of year and DER-payment value, making four 
sub-categories: DER payer, DER terminator, DER initiator, and Non-DER payer.  If a firm is a 
DER-payment firm in both 2002 and 2004 then it is a DER payer.  If it is a DER-payment firm in 
2002 but not in 2004, then it is a terminator.  If it is a DER-payment firm in 2004 but not in 2002, 
then it is a DER initiator.  If it is not a DER-payment firm in either 2002 or 2004 then it is a non-
DER payer.  Panel A of Table 1.11 provides a detailed description of each classification process 
and the number of firms that fall in the sub-categories. 
Table 1.11. 2003 Dividend Tax Reform as an Exogenous Shock 
 
Panel A. Sample Breakdown, Years 2002-2004 
Category Description # of firms 
Policy firm  All time DER policy holder during 2002-2004 55 
Policy terminator Ceased DER policy in 2003 or 2004 0 
Policy initiator Initiated DER policy in 2003 or 2004 18 
Non-policy firm All time non-DER policy holder during 2002-2004 247 
Total # of sample firms  320 
DE payer All time DE payer during 2002-2004 21 
DE terminator Ceased DE payments in 2003 or 2004 3 
DE initiator Initiated DE payments in 2003 or 2004 11 
Non-DE payer All time non-DE payer during 2002-2004 285 
Total # of sample firms  320 
DIV payer All time dividend payer during 2002-2004 185 
DIV terminator Ceased dividend payments in 2003 or 2004 6 
DIV initiator Initiated dividend payment in 2003 or 2004 25 
Non-DIV payer All-time non-dividend payer during 2002-2004 104 
Total # of sample firms  320 
Notes: The dividend tax reform legislation was in 2003.  There are 320 sample firms that have complete 
data spanning 2002-2004.  The sample firms are classified in three dimensions:  their DER policy changes 
over the three years, their DE payment activities over the three years, and their dividend payout activities 
over the three years.  In each dimension the firms can be classified into either one of the four categories.   
The first column features the categories, the second column contains the explanation of each category and 
the third column contains the number of sample firms that have fallen into each category. 
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Panel B.  Two-way Tables and Fisher’s Exact Test Results 
  DER policy   
DIVIDEND 
Policy 
initiator 
Non-policy 
firm Policy firm 
Policy 
terminator Row Total 
DIV initiator 1 22 2 0 25 
(1.41) (19.30) (4.30) (0)   
Non-DIV 
payer 
4 93 7 0 104 
(5.85) (80.28) (17.88) (0)   
DIV payer 13 127 45 0 185 
(10.41) (142.80) (31.80) (0)   
DIV 
terminator 
0 5 1 0 6 
(0.15) (4.63) (1.03) (0)   
Col Total 18 247 55 0 320 
Fisher's Exact test P-value: 0.0020       
      
  DE payments   
DIVIDEND DE initiator 
Non-DE 
payer DE payer 
DE 
terminator Row Total 
DIV initiator 1 24 0 0 25 
(0.86) (22.27) (1.64) (0.23)   
Non-DIV 
payer 
0 103 0 1 104 
(3.58) (92.63) (6.83) (0.98)   
DIV payer 10 152 21 2 185 
(6.36) (164.77) (12.14) (1.73)   
DIV 
terminator 
0 6 0 0 6 
(0.21) (5.34) (0.39) (0.06)   
Column Total 11 285 21 3 320 
Fisher's Exact test P-value: 0.0004       
Notes: The two-way tables above summarize the sample distribution: dividend payout activities by DER 
policy changes, and dividend payout activities by DE payment activities.  Categories are defined in Panel 
A. Results of the Fisher Exact tests are displayed below each table. 
 
 The two-way table in Panel B shows the distribution of firms according to their dividend 
policy changes, represented by the rows, and their DER activity changes, represented by the 
columns.  Let us focus on DER policy, the upper half of the table.  We find 18 firms that initiated 
DER policies, of which one initiated regular dividends, four were non-dividend payers, 13 paid 
dividends both years, and none terminated dividends.  We find 247 firms that had no DER policy 
in either year, of which 22 initiated regular dividends, 93 paid no dividends, 127 paid dividends 
both years, and five terminated dividends.  We find 55 firms that had DER policies in both years, 
 60 
  
of which two initiated dividends, seven paid no dividends in either year, 45 paid dividends in both 
years and one terminated dividends.  We find no firm that terminated a DER policy. 
The Fisher Exact Test reveals that how a firm changes its dividend policy during the tax 
reform period is influenced by its DER policies.  The null hypothesis of the Fisher Exact Test is 
that the proportions of the variable represented by rows are independent of the proportions of the 
variable represented by columns.  In the context of our study, the null hypothesis is that the 
proportions of dividend initiators, non-dividend payers, dividend payers and dividend terminators 
in the sample are independent of the proportions of policy initiators, non-policy firms, policy firms, 
and policy terminators.  We calculate the expected values under the null hypothesis and shown 
them in the parenthesis on the bottom of each cell.31  The Fisher Exact test shows that the null 
hypothesis is rejected and thus the variable represented by the columns is not independent of the 
variable represented by the rows, further confirming that firms’ dividend policies and DER policies 
are not independent. 32   
 Note that 22 non-DER policy holders initiated dividend payments during the tax reform 
period, while only two policy holders initiated dividend payments during that period.  That is nine 
percent of non-policy holders versus four percent of policy holders. 33   If DER policies and 
dividend payments are independent of each other, it would be expected that there would be 19 
                                                   
31For example, the cell in the upper left corner of the table is for the firms that are both dividend initiators and DER 
policy initiators.  The actual value is one and the expected value is 1.41.  The expected value is calculated as follows: 
the expected proportions of firms that are both dividend initiators and DER policy initiators is the product of the 
proportion of dividend initiators and the proportions of DER policy initiators, thus is (25/320)*(18/320)=0.0044.  The 
expected number of firms is thus 320*0.0044=1.41. 
 
32Unlike many other studies involving independence tests, we do not use the Chi-square test.  Chi-square estimates 
are not reliable when there are many expected cell frequencies less than five, which is the case in the two-way tables 
in Table 11. 
 
33There are a total of 247 non-policy holders, which is shown in the bottom row.  22 of them initiated dividend payment 
during the tax reform.  That is, 22/247=8.91%.  There are a total of 55 DER policy holders and only two of them 
initiated dividend payments during the tax reform.  The percentage is thus 2/55=3.63%. 
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non-policy holders who initiated dividend payments and four policy holders who initiated dividend 
payments.34  Both numbers deviate somewhat from their actual values.  A greater than expected 
number of non-policy holders initiated dividends, while a lower than expected number of policy 
holders initiated dividends.  
The tax reform act as an external policy change is believed to have provided firms with 
incentives to increase dividend payout levels so that their shareholders can benefit from lower 
taxes on dividends.  Thus, if a firm were not yet a dividend payer, it might initiate dividend 
payments.  A firm initiating dividends would do so with caution, however, in that it implicitly 
committed to being a dividend payer for at least a moderately long period.  A firm would weigh 
the benefits of pleasing the shareholders and the costs of a long-term commitment before making 
the decision to initiate dividends or to remain a non-payer.   
Therefore the tax reform could have different effects on non-dividend payers.  For some 
non-dividend payers the decision to initiate dividends as a result of the tax law change was the 
proper one.  Those firms would likely be characterized as having a combination of sufficient cash 
flows to support future dividend payments and insufficient investment opportunities to require 
internal funding.  Prior to the tax reduction, the absence of a DER policy did not provide sufficient 
incentives to pay dividends, and the managers were probably sensitive to the fact that their 
shareholders would pay a high tax rate on income that is already doubly taxed.  With the reduction 
in the personal tax rate on dividends, they were probably induced to become dividend payers.  
Then, at the margin the dividend tax cut pushed them to become dividend payers. 
For firms that already had DER policies, all but three did not modify their dividend policies 
during the tax reform – two initiated dividends and one terminated the payment of dividends.  For 
                                                   
 
34The expected frequency is calculated as (25/320)*(247/320)*320=19.30; (25/320)*(55/320)*320=4.30. 
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dividend payers and non-payers, the current status was optimal for most firms in this category.  If 
a DER policy holder fit the profile of a dividend payer, it was very likely that the DER policy had 
already provided incentives to initiate dividends.  If a DER policy holder were better off remaining 
a non-dividend payer, then having a DER policy did not incentivize it to be a dividend payer, and 
the incentives that the tax dividend cut could provide were probably not sufficient.  Therefore we 
observe few dividend initiation events in the DER policy holder category.   
Another message delivered by the deviations in the cells lies in the dividend payers.  104 
firms are classified as dividend payers during the tax reform.  13 of them are initiated DER policy, 
127 firms did not have DER policy, 45 firms had DER policy and none of them terminated DER 
policy.   
Among these dividend payers, the groups that have the largest deviations between the 
actual number of firms and expected number of firms are the non-policy firms and policy firms.  
There were fewer than expected non-policy firms paying dividends during the dividend tax reform 
period, while more than expected policy firms paid dividends during that period.  The non-
dividend payers show somewhat symmetric patterns with the dividend payers.  More than expected 
non-policy firms were non-dividend payers during the dividend tax reform while fewer than 
expected policy firms were dividend payers.  The patterns in the dividend payers and non-dividend 
payers both deliver the same message, which is that DER policy firms are more likely to be 
dividend payers.35      
The distribution in the lower half of the table titled “DE payments” is consistent with the 
results based on “DER policy” in the upper half of the table.  The Fisher Exact Test reveals that 
how a firm changes its dividend policy during the tax reform period is related to its DE payments.  
                                                   
35The dividend terminators were only six firms.  The numbers in all the four cells are too small to draw firm 
conclusions. 
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The two sets of results using the DER policy measure and the actual payment measure are 
consistent with the hypothesis that allowing for DE payments or making DE payments on CEOs’ 
unearned shares encourages firms to pay dividends.  
1.6 Conclusion and Extension 
 This paper studies the incentives that dividend equivalent rights (DERs) on unearned shares 
provide to CEOs.  The results indicate that dividend equivalent rights on CEOs’ unearned shares, 
although not well received by the market, can provide dividend incentives to CEOs.  Firms that 
have policies allowing DE payments on CEOs’ unearned shares are more likely to be dividend 
payers, and firms that make actual DE payments tend to pay higher dividends.  The results are 
robust to various measures for dividend payout level.  To address the endogeneity between firms’ 
dividend policies and DER policies we use lagged variables, matched-samples, and the 2003 tax 
reform as an exogenous shock for empirical tests.  The evidence is consistent with the notion that 
DERs can lead to higher dividend payout levels.   
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CHAPTER 2. VALUATING DIVIDEND EQUIVALENTS USING A 
UTILITY-BASED EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTION PRICING MODEL IN A 
BINOMIAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, dividend equivalents entitle executives to receive dividends on 
shares covered by their performance-based equity awards, which are referred to as “unearned 
shares.”  From 1993 to 2012 around 22 percent of S&P500 firms allow for dividend equivalents 
to be granted on CEOs’ unearned shares.  Different performance-based awards underlying 
dividend equivalents form a large family – executive stock options, stock appreciation rights, 
performance stock or units, performance-based restricted stock or units.  The variation in the 
underlying awards provides the scholars a rich pool of research topics.  In contrast to their 
extensive usage and the large research potential they provide, dividend equivalents are poorly 
documented in the literature.  In Chapter 1 we examine how dividend equivalents affect firms’ 
corporate payout policy.  We find that dividend equivalents granted on CEOs’ unearned shares can 
encourage firms to increase their dividend payout level, and thus can be beneficial to firms and 
shareholders.  Our study is the first empirical analysis of this widely used executive compensation 
tool.  Many issues and questions remained unanswered.   
In our previous study we examined the incentives that dividend equivalents can provide.  
We argue that dividend equivalents can encourage firms to disgorge excessive cash, and thus they 
can be a very useful tool to reduce one type of agency problem.  We are aware of the benefits of 
this executive compensation tool.  But this is only the “demand side” of the story.  We are still 
interested in the “supply side” of the story – How costly is this tool?  How should we valuate this 
tool?  Is the benefit worth the cost?   This essay aims to answer these questions.  
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In the context of executive compensation, certain instruments are granted to an executive 
by the firm.  We can consider this process as a transaction.  One agent pays the other for the 
services the he can provide.  The deal is made based on mutual agreement.  Both sides of the 
transaction – the firm and the executive – are important when evaluating the compensation 
instruments.  To fully understand the value of a compensation instrument, we have to know its 
value to each side of the transaction.  We need to find out how much the instrument is worth to the 
firm – the “company cost” –, and how much the instrument is worth to the executive – the 
“executive’s subjective value”.   
Intuitively the valuation of dividend equivalents is influenced by the underlying 
instruments.  We choose dividend equivalents granted on executive stock options as the object.  
Our choice is based on two reasons:  Firstly, dividend equivalents granted on executive stock 
option awards have been popular.  In 1993 more than one fourth of dividend equivalents were 
granted with executive stock options.  Secondly, we need a reliable model to evaluate the dividend 
equivalents and the option pricing literature provides us with a large set of executive option pricing 
models to select from.  We adopt a utility-based executive stock option pricing model (Hall & 
Murphy 2002) for its simple and flexible model framework and rich intuition.   
We want to show the effect of payment methods on the value and the cost of dividend 
equivalents.  The two most commonly used payment methods are an instant cash payment and 
payment made in shares of stock.  We show that the dividend equivalents for the two payment 
methods are equally costly to firms but are valued differently by executives.  In all cases a risk-
averse executive assigns a higher value to dividend equivalents if they are paid in cash than if they 
are reinvested in shares of stock.  We also show that the costs of dividend equivalents to firms are 
always higher or equal to an executive’s subjective value of dividend equivalents.  We also 
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examine the effects of factors such as the executive’s degree of risk aversion, the executive’s asset 
allocation, the length of the option vesting period, and the dividend payout level.   
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Dividend Protection on Stock Options  
Our study is related to the line of research on dividend protection of stock options.  Most 
over-the-counter options offer dividend protection (Geske et al. 1983).  This protection can be 
made by reducing the strike price by the amount of dividend, by offering cash equivalent to the 
product of the dividend and the number of shares covered by the options, or by accumulating the 
dividends until the options are exercised.   
 Executive stock options are usually not dividend-protected, and expected dividend payouts 
reduce the value of executive stock options (Murphy 1999; Arnold & Gillenkirch 2005; Zhang 
2012) just as they would with ordinary call options.  Empirical evidence has shown that the absence 
of dividend protection on executive stock options is associated with a decrease in corporate 
dividends (Lambert et al. 1989; Arnold & Gillenkirch 2005), while dividend protection on 
executives’ restricted stocks and options can increase corporate dividend payouts (Zhang 2012).  
In contrast to the rich empirical results on dividend protection is the lack of theory regarding this 
matter.  Dividend protection on options can reduce or even eliminate early exercise.  To avoid 
confounding dividend protection with other factors related to prevention of early exercise, 
researchers usually assume no dividend protection in their executive option pricing models.   
 In practice, dividend protection on executive stock options is not common.  Murphy (1999) 
documents that only seven out of a sample of 618 executive stock option grants in US firms are 
dividend protected.  Zhang (2012) reports that less than one percent of US large firms have 
dividend protection on executives’ stock options.  Dividend protection on executive stock options, 
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however, is more popular in European firms than in US firms.  Arnold et al (2005) documents that 
around one-third of executive stock option grants in Germany are dividend-protected.  It is not 
clearly stated, but we infer that none of those studies consider dividend equivalents granted on 
executive stock options a form of dividend protection.36  But dividend equivalents granted on 
executive stock options should be considered as a form of dividend protection – both paying 
dividend equivalents to executives and reducing the strike price can adjust for the decrease in the 
underlying stock price due to dividends.  According to our data, in 1993 more than five percent of 
US large firms allow for dividend equivalents on stock options. 
 As is mentioned above, the payment of dividend equivalents on executive stock option 
awards are made in two general forms: cash and share of stock.  The actual payment forms can 
have more variations.  For example, the firm can deliver cash or shares instantly to the executive, 
or the firm can hold the cash or shares until certain conditions are met – either the vesting period 
is over or the executive exercise the options.   
The different forms of dividend protection on executive stock option awards vary among 
firms.  Some firms allow executives to receive dividend equivalents on their options up to certain 
years.  For instance, United Technologies Corp. allows executives to receive cash dividends on 
their executive stock options for seven years (UTC 1996).  Some other firms allow executives to 
receive dividend equivalents on a portion of their option holdings.   
Most firms require vesting periods on executive stock option grants.  Executives cannot 
exercise options before they are vested.  Vesting schedules may be different among firms.  Both 
the vesting conditions and length of vesting periods vary.  Some firms prohibit executives from 
immediately selling shares after they obtain them by exercising executive stock options.  Those 
                                                   
36In fact, none of those studies mention dividend equivalents.  
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firms do not issue common stocks to their executives when the latter exercise their executive stock 
options.  Instead, they either issue stock units or restricted stocks to them.  
2.2.2 Stock Option Pricing Models 
Employee stock options differ from listed options in many ways: (1) Listed options can be 
traded on in the market freely before they expire.  Employee stock options are not transferable and 
are usually subject to a vesting period during which they are not exercisable. Thus, employee stock 
options are considerably less liquid than listed options.  (2) A holder of American-style listed 
options can exercise the options any time prior to expiration date.  A holder of European-style 
listed options can exercise only on the date of expiration.  For employee stock options, the decision 
to exercise is influenced by more factors, one of which being the employment status of the option 
holder.  If the employee leaves the company, he would ordinarily exercise all vested in-the-money 
options immediately.  All unvested options and out-of-money options would be forfeited.  (3) 
When a holder of listed options exercises his shares, he buys the shares that are covered by the 
options from the option seller, or technically the exchange clearinghouse.  However when an 
option holder exercises his employee stock options, he buys shares that are newly issued by the 
company.  Although the number of newly issued stocks is typically very small compared to the 
number of shares of existing stocks, if the issuance of employee stock options is not anticipated 
by the market, a dilution effect may occur.37 
The features of employee stock options that are mentioned above make it difficult to 
calculate the value of these options.  In 1995, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
                                                   
37Cash settled options such as Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs) resemble employee stock options in that holders of 
SARs benefit from an increase in stock price.  SARs differ from options in that when the holder exercises the SARs 
he does not have to purchase any stocks to receive the proceedings.  The holder receives cash equivalent to the increase 
in stock price.  The proceedings are expenses to the company.  But since no new stocks are created when the holder 
exercises his SARs, thus there is no dilution effect.    
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released Statement No. 123 (FASB 1995), Accounting for Stock-based Compensation, in which 
the FASB suggested, but did not require, companies to use a fair-value method in valuing 
employee stock options.  The Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model (Black & Scholes 1973; 
Merton 1976) and the Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (Cox et al. 1979) binomial model are cited in 
FAS 123 as acceptable fair-value methods (FASB 1995).  The Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) 
model assumes that no taxes or transaction costs exist, the stock pays no dividends and no early 
exercise of options is allowed.  To apply the BSM model to employee stock options some 
assumptions need to be relaxed or modified.  For an example, to account for the dividends, assume 
a fixed proportion of stock price is paid out as dividends regularly (dividend yield), then include 
the dividend yield in the expression of the stock price at a given time.  For another, both the BSM 
and the binomial model can use the estimated life of the option as the time to maturity and adjusting 
the option value to allow for the possibility of the employee separating from the company when 
the option is unvested.  A number of empirical studies use the Black-Scholes-Merton model to 
value employee stock options (Foster et al. 1993; Yermack 1995; Hull & White 2004).   Carpenter 
(1998), Hull and White (2004) discuss a few issues in the practice of applying the Black-Scholes-
Merton model to employee stock options and present alternative approaches to address these 
issues.  FAS 123 does not provide a way to estimate the life of an employee stock option.  
Theoretically the life of an employee stock option consists of a vesting period and a period during 
which the option is exercisable.  In reality the life of the employee option is shorter if any one of 
the two events occurs: (1) the employee leaves the company prior to the option expiration; or (2) 
the employee decides to exercise early.  To estimate the life of employee stock options, Hull and 
White suggest using the employee turnover rate to incorporate the possibility of event (1).  To 
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access the possibility of event (2) they assume the employee will exercise early if the stock price 
is a certain multiple of the exercise price. 
Arnold and Gillenkirch (2005) propose a two – period model to analyze how dividend 
protection on executive stock options can affect a firm’s dividend payout policy. The paper does 
not provide an executive stock option pricing model, but it recognizes that there are different ways 
of dividend protection and provides some insight in how to design dividend protection. The model 
assumes an all-equity financed firm, a perfect capital market and information asymmetry between 
the shareholders and the manager, specifically that managers have inside information.  At time t = 
0 the representative manager is granted European call options on the firm’s stock that expire at 
time t = 2.  The manager makes the investment and payout decision at time t = 1 of whether to 
distribute cash flow to shareholders or to reinvest in projects.  The model takes into consideration 
three ways of dividend protection: adding compounded dividends to the stock price at t = 2, 
subtracting compounded dividends from the exercise price at t = 2, and increasing the number of 
shares per option by the number of additional shares the manager could have bought if he could 
receive dividends on his executive stock options.  The third way of dividend protection mentioned 
is so called “Opération Blanche”. It is equivalent to compounding dividends with the issuing firm’s 
realized return during the option holding period and add the value to the stock price when the 
options are exercised.  Arnold and Gillenkirch find that when there is no information asymmetry 
and “Opération Blanche” is adopted in executive stock option grants, managers and shareholders 
can reach an agreement on firm value (Arnold & Gillenkirch 2005).   
Hall and Murphy’s utility-based executive option pricing model (Hall & Murphy 2002) 
shows that executive stock options are “overpriced” using the Black-Scholes formula.  The main 
problems are: first, executive stock options are not as liquid as over-the-counter stock options.  
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They cannot be sold or transferred freely.  Furthermore, executives cannot hedge their position to 
offset the illiquidity of their options.  Second, they are generally not dividend-protected.  Few 
companies allow any forms of dividend protection on executive stock options.  The subjective 
value of executive stock options (to the executives) and the cost of executive stock options (to the 
firm) should be distinguished.  Hall and Murphy’s model plays an important role in our research.  
By a few modifications, their model can be adapted and used to account for the variations in forms 
of dividend protection discussed above.  
2.3 The Model  
Consistent with Hall and Murphy’s executive option pricing model, we assume the options 
are non-tradable and the representative executive is undiversified and risk-averse.  We believe 
these assumptions capture real world situations.  We assume one percent of executive stock options 
are granted with dividend equivalents during their vesting period.  We define the value of a 
dividend equivalent to an executive as the amount of cash compensation invested at the risk -free 
rate for which the executive would exchange the dividend equivalents.  In other words, the utility 
of the cash compensation and the dividend equivalents is the same.  We define the cost of the 
dividend equivalents on executive stock options to be the present value of all dividend equivalents 
paid to the executive during the vesting period.   
We construct a utility-based binomial executive stock option pricing model similar to the 
one in Hall and Murphy (2002).  Assume a firm has one representative executive whose 
preferences are defined by a power utility function, 
𝑈(𝑊) =
𝑊1−𝜌
1 − 𝜌
, 𝜌 ≠ 1 
where 𝜌 is the executive’s constant relative risk aversion and 𝑊 is the executive’s total wealth. 
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We start with a multi-period model: day 0, day 1,…, until day T, all of which are ex-
dividend dates.  On day 0, the representative executive has non-firm-related wealth of 𝐶 (cash 
compensation), and is granted 𝑚 shares of the firm’s stock and 𝑛 at-the-money options that each 
covers one share of the firm’s stock.  The stock price at time 0 is 𝑆.  The strike price of the options 
is 𝐾.  From day 0 to day T is the vesting period during which dividend equivalents are paid out, 
and the executive is not allowed to exercise the options.  The executive is relatively undiversified.  
During the vesting period, he invests all his non-firm related wealth in risk-free bonds. 
The path of the stock price from day 0 to day T can be represented by a binomial tree with 
T steps.  Let 𝑖 denote the steps (days) and 𝑗 denote the number of up movements of the stock price.  
Each node on the binomial tree is denoted by 𝑆(𝑖, 𝑗) where 𝑖 = 0, 1, 2 and 𝑗 = 0, . . . , 𝑖.  Suppose at 
each node the stock price is expected to go up by a factor 𝑢 with a probability of 𝑝, or to go down 
by a factor of 𝑑 with a probability of (1 − 𝑝).  On day 𝑖 there are 𝑖 possible states.  The stock price 
and the options’ intrinsic value depend on which state is realized.  On each day the states are 
indexed by 𝑗s.  On the binomial tree each state is represented by one node.  The stock price on day 
𝑖 in state 𝑗 is: 
𝑆(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑆𝑢𝑗𝑑𝑖−𝑗, 
where 𝑖 = 0, 1, 𝑇 and  𝑗 = 0, . . . , 𝑖.   
 The probability of reaching state 𝑗 on day 𝑖 is: 
𝑝(𝑖, 𝑗) = (
𝑖
𝑗
) 𝑝𝑗(1 − 𝑝)𝑖−𝑗 
Below is an example of the distribution of stock price after two steps:  
𝑆(2, 𝑗) = {
𝑢2𝑆 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑝2 , 𝑗 = 2          
      𝑢𝑑𝑆  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  2𝑝(1 − 𝑝), 𝑗 = 1
  𝑑2𝑆 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  (1 − 𝑝)2, 𝑗 = 0
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As is shown in the example, if the stock price increases in both of the two steps, the realized state 
is the state (2,2), the stock price in state (2,2) is 𝑢2𝑆, and the probability to reach the state is 𝑝2.  
If the stock price increases in one step and decreases in one step then the realized state is the state 
(2,1) with stock price 𝑢𝑑𝑆 and probability 2𝑝(1 − 𝑝).  If the stock price decreases in both steps, 
then the realized state is the state (2,0) with stock price 𝑑2𝑆 and probability (1 − 𝑝)2. 
The option’s value on day 𝑇 in state 𝑗 is 𝑋(𝑇, 𝑗) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑆(𝑇, 𝑗) − 𝐾), 𝑗 = 0, . . . , 𝑇.   
During the vesting period the executive receives dividend equivalents on some of his stock 
options.  Letting 𝐷𝐸 denote the accumulated dividend equivalents, the executive’s wealth on day 
T in state 𝑗 is given by: 
𝑊(𝑇, 𝑗) ≡ 𝐶(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑇
+ 𝑚𝑆(𝑇, 𝑗) + ∑ 𝑚𝐷𝑖𝑣(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑇−𝑖
𝑇
𝑖=1
+ 𝑛𝑋(𝑇, 𝑗) + 𝐷𝐸(𝑇, 𝑗) 
where 𝑟𝑓 denotes the risk-free rate at which the cash compensation was invested, and 𝐷𝑖𝑣 is the 
dividends paid on each share of common stock.  The executive’s expected utility at time T is: 
𝐸(𝑈(𝑊𝑇 )) = ∑ 𝑈(𝑊(𝑇, 𝑗))𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇, 𝑗)
𝑇
𝑗=0
= ∑ (
(𝑇
𝑗
) 𝑝𝑗 (1 − 𝑝)𝑇−𝑗
1 − 𝜌
 
𝑇
𝑗=0
×  (𝐶(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑇
+ 𝑚𝑆(𝑇, 𝑗) + ∑ 𝑚𝐷𝑖𝑣(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑇−𝑖
𝑇
𝑖=1
+ 𝑛𝑋(𝑇, 𝑗)
+ 𝐷𝐸(𝑇, 𝑗))
1−𝜌
)                                 
(1)  
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If the executive was awarded cash compensation of 𝐶 + 𝑉, 𝑚 shares of firm stocks, and 𝑛 
stock options, his wealth on day T in state 𝑗 is given by: 
𝑊𝑉(𝑇, 𝑗) ≡ (𝐶 + 𝑉)(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑇
+ 𝑚𝑆(𝑇, 𝑗) + ∑ 𝑚𝐷𝑖𝑣(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑇−𝑖
𝑇
𝑖=1
+ 𝑛𝑋(𝑇, 𝑗) 
If the executive is granted cash compensation of value 𝑉, 𝑚 shares of firm stocks, 𝑛 stock 
options and no dividend equivalents, the executive’s expected utility at time T is: 
𝐸(𝑈(𝑊𝑇
𝑉)) = ∑ 𝑈(𝑊𝑉 (𝑇, 𝑗))𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇, 𝑗)
𝑇
𝑗=0
= ∑ (
(𝑇
𝑗
) 𝑝𝑗(1 − 𝑝)𝑇−𝑗
1 − 𝜌
 
𝑇
𝑗=0
× ((𝐶 + 𝑉)(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑇
+ 𝑚𝑆(𝑇, 𝑗) + ∑ 𝑚𝐷𝑖𝑣(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑇−𝑖
𝑇
𝑖=1
+ 𝑛𝑋(𝑇, 𝑗))
1−𝜌
)  
(2) 
𝑉 is the equivalent value of the stock options perceived by the executive at time 𝑡 = 0. The 
numerical solution of  𝑉 can be obtained by solving: 
𝐸(𝑈(𝑊𝑇 )) = 𝐸(𝑈(𝑊𝑇
𝑉 )) 
2.4 Payment Forms of Dividend Equivalents 
On day 𝑖 the firm pays dividend of 𝐷𝑖𝑣 on each share of the firm’s common stock.  We 
assume that dividend equivalents are paid on one percent of the executive stock options at the same 
time.  We consider two ways of payments – instant cash paid to the executive when dividends are 
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paid to common stock holders, and shares granted to the executive that have the same value as the 
dividend equivalents. 
2.4.1 Instant Cash Payment 
This is the simplest case.  Cash dividends paid to the executive can be considered as 
complementary cash compensation that is paid on day 𝑖 and will be reinvested at the risk-free rate.  
The cumulated dividend equivalents on day T is not dependent on the realized state.  Rather it is 
only dependent on the amount of dividend equivalents that have been paid out, the risk -free rate 
and the length of time during which the cash dividend equivalents are reinvested.  Assume the 
portion of options that are covered by dividend equivalent rights is 𝑞, then the cumulated dividend 
equivalents on day T is: 
𝐷𝐸(𝑇, 𝑗) = 𝐷𝐸(𝑇) = ∑ 𝑛𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑣(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑇−𝑖𝑇
𝑖=1  .  
Note that the first dividend equivalents are paid on day 1.   
The executive’s expected utility functions (1) can be rewritten as: 
𝐸(𝑈(𝑊𝑇)) = ∑ 𝑈(𝑊𝑇,𝑗)𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇, 𝑗)
𝑇
𝑗=0
= ∑ (
(
𝑇
𝑗
) 𝑝𝑗(1 − 𝑝)𝑇−𝑗
1 − 𝜌
𝑇
𝑗=0
× (𝐶(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑇
+ 𝑚𝑆(𝑇, 𝑗) + ∑ 𝑚𝐷𝑖𝑣(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑇−𝑖
𝑇
𝑖=1
+ 𝑛𝑋(𝑇, 𝑗)
+ ∑ 𝑛𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑣(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑇−𝑖
𝑇
𝑖=1
)
1−𝜌
)      
 (3)  
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 The equation above shows that the subjective value of cash dividend equivalents is a 
function of a series of variables: the length of the vesting period, the realized state at the end of the 
vesting period, the probability for the stock price to go up, the risk-free rate, the non-firm-related 
wealth, the amount of the stock holdings, the amount of option holdings, the ending value of firm 
shares and stock options, and the dividends.  Of those variables, only the ending value of the shares 
and the options are stochastic.  Since on each day the stock price is associated with only one 
realized state, the ending values of firm shares and stock options are determined by the realized 
state at the end of the vesting period.  The binomial tree shows that there can be multiple paths to 
achieve a certain realized state.38  However the path will not affect the result. 
The numerical solution of 𝑉can be found by equating the expected utility functions (3) and 
(2), and solving for 𝑉. 
2.4.2 Dividend Equivalents Reinvested in Firm Shares 
 Sometimes a firm does not pay cash dividend equivalents, but rather grants a number of 
shares to the executives.  Let us refer to these shares as stock dividend equivalents in order to show 
that they are granted in lieu of cash dividend equivalents.  The total value of the stock dividend 
equivalents equals the total cash value of the dividend equivalents to which the executive is 
entitled.   
The number of stock dividend equivalents earned by the executive on day 𝑖 is thus the cash 
value of the dividend equivalents divided by the stock price on that day.  Assume the portion of 
options that are covered by dividend equivalent rights is 𝑞 and the realized state on day 𝑖 is state 
𝑗, then the number of stock dividend equivalents earned by the executive 𝑀(𝑖, 𝑗) is: 
                                                   
38For example, from S(0,0) to S(2,1), there are two possible paths: S(0,0) to S(1,1) to S(2,1), and S(0,0) to S(1,0) to 
S(2,1). 
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𝑀(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝑛𝑞𝐷𝑖𝑣
𝑆(𝑖, 𝑗 )
 . 
Note that 𝑀(𝑖, 𝑗) is a function of the executive’s stock option holding, the portion of options 
covered by dividend equivalent rights, the dividend per share, and the stock price on day 𝑖 in state 
𝑗.   
 On each ex-dividend day other than day 0 there are multiple possible states.  Since the 
number of stock dividend equivalents granted on each ex-dividend day is related to the realized 
stock price on that day, the cumulated number of stock dividend equivalents during the vesting 
period is thus a function of the path of the firm’s stock price.  The total number of possible paths 
for the stock price from day 0 to day 𝑇 is 2𝑇.  Assume that before the underlying options vest, the 
stock dividend equivalents cannot be traded.39  Let 𝑘 denotes the 𝑘th path, then the cumulated 
number of stock dividend equivalents is: 
∑ 𝑀𝑘(𝑖, 𝑗 (𝑘))
𝑇
𝑖=0
 
and the cumulated value of stock dividend equivalents for the 𝑘th path is: 
𝐷𝐸𝑘(𝑇, 𝑗(𝑘)) = (∑ 𝑀𝑘(𝑖, 𝑗(𝑘))
𝑇
𝑖=1
) ∙ 𝑆(𝑇, 𝑗(𝑘)) 
where 𝑗(𝑘) shows the fact that the realized state on each ex-dividend day is path-specific.  
 The probability that the 𝑘th path is the realized path for the stock price is: 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘) = 𝑝𝑗(𝑘)(1 − 𝑝)𝑇−𝑗(𝑘). 
The executive’s expected utility functions (1) can be rewritten as: 
                                                   
39For instance, the firm requires the stock dividend equivalents to be kept in a separate account and delivered to the 
executive when the option awards vest. 
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𝐸(𝑈(𝑊𝑇 )) = ∑ 𝑈𝑘(𝑊𝑇,𝑗)𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑘)
2𝑇
𝑘=1
=  ∑ (𝑝𝑗(𝑘)(1 − 𝑝)𝑇−𝑗(𝑘)
𝑇
𝑗=0
× (𝐶(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑇
+ 𝑚𝑆(𝑇, 𝑗(𝑘)) + ∑ 𝑚𝐷𝑖𝑣(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑇−𝑖
𝑇
𝑖=1
+ 𝑛𝑋(𝑇, 𝑗(𝑘))
+ (∑ 𝑀𝑘(𝑖, 𝑗(𝑘))
𝑇
𝑖=1
) ∙ 𝑆(𝑇, 𝑗(𝑘)))
1−𝜌
) 
(4) 
The numerical solution of 𝑉can be found by equating expected utility functions (4) and (2) and 
solving for 𝑉. 
Awarding shares of firm stocks as a means of dividend protection on executive stock 
options and other unearned/unvested stocks (units) is gaining popularity among US firms.  
Intuitively it provides more incentives to executives than cash dividends do because the value of 
dividend equivalents is bonded to the firm stock price.   
We have incorporated two types of dividend equivalent payments into the expected utility-
binomial framework.   In the following sections we will first choose a set of input variables that 
can capture the executive compensation among the U.S. firms, the market condition and firm 
characteristics, the executives’ preferences and the features of dividend equivalent payments on 
executive compensation awards, then we will continue to conduct a numerical analysis to examine 
the model and valuate dividend equivalents granted on executive stock options. 
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2.5 Input Variables 
The utility-based binomial model has fourteen variables from five categories: one category 
includes variables that are related to the representative executive’s company; another category 
includes variables related to the underlying options; another one includes variables related to the 
stock market, another one includes variables associated with the representative executive, and 
another includes variables specific to the simulation process. 
2.5.1 Firm-specific Variables 
Stock price: Both Hall and Murphy and Chance and Yang assume the stock price to be $30.  
We follow them and also assume the stock price of the representative firm to be $30.   
Dividend per share: The empirical data show that dividend protection of executive stock 
options is not common and almost all studies documented in the executive stock option literature 
assume no dividend protection.  Dividend protection on executive stock options can trigger early 
exercise. The assumption of no dividends is thus made when other factors that can contribute to 
early exercise are examined (Chance & Yang 2005).  Though dividend protection on executive 
stock options is rarely documented in the literature, it may not be as rare as scholars have believed.  
Dividend protection on executive stock options can be realized by issuing dividend equivalents on 
executive stock option awards.  As shown in Chapter 1, during the sample period of 1993 to 2012, 
twenty-two percent of S&P500 firms have a policy to grant dividend equivalents on their CEOs’ 
performance-based equity awards.  Figure 2.1 shows that in 1993, in more than one fifth of the 
firms that grant dividend equivalents the underlying are executive stock options.  In the analysis it 
is assumed that five percent of the executive stock options are granted with dividend equivalents.  
Dividend equivalents are issued at the same time when common dividends are paid out.  The 
dividend equivalents paid on one share of underlying stock match the dividends paid on one share 
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of common stock.  Over the period from 1993 to 2012 a typical S&P 500 firm that makes regular 
dividend payments paid $1.10 on each share of its common stock.  The first quartile, median and 
third quartile are $0.45, $0.90, and $1.48 respectively.  At the end of 2012 a typical S&P500 firm 
that makes regular dividend payments paid $1.33 dividends per share.  The first quartile, median 
and third quartile are $0.60, $1.10, and $1.79 respectively.  Our analysis assumes that the 
representative firm pays quarterly dividends of $0.50 per share.  We also examine the dividend per 
share of $0.20 and $1.00.   
 
Figure 2.1. Dividend Equivalents Grants by Underlying Awards 
Notes:  The sample period is from 1993 to 2011.  The dividend equivalent granted are classified by 
underlying awards – performance stock and units, executive stock options and performance-based restricted 
stock and units. 
 
Volatility: Following Chance and Yang we use 50% as the volatility when calculating the 
up-factor u and the down-factor d. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Performance stock (units) Executive stock option
Performance-based restricted stock
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Beta: In our previous study on dividend equivalents, we chose S&P500 component firms 
as our sample firms.  Intuitively larger firms have greater co-movements with the market.  The 
beta of the market portfolio is 1; we thus assume the representative firm’s beta is 1.  
2.5.2 Option-related Variables 
 Exercise price: Most grants are awarded at-the-money.  Thus, we set the exercise price 
equal to the current stock price.  
 Vesting period: In the analysis we examine the effect of the length of the vesting period.  
We assume no changes are made on the original vesting period once the stock option awards are 
granted.  During the vesting period the representative executive cannot exercise the stock options 
covered by the awards, and no accelerated vesting conditions are allowed.  Hall and Murphy 
assume vesting period of 2, 3, and 4 years.  In my analysis the original vesting period of 1, 2, 3 
and 4 years are all considered.  Since the representative firm pays quarterly dividends, the numbers 
of steps used in the analysis are then 4, 8, 12, and 16.   
2.5.3 Market-related Variables 
 Risk-free rate: We calculate the average monthly risk free rate and multiply by three to get 
the estimated average quarterly risk free rate.  The average quarterly risk free rate from 1993 to 
2012 is around 0.985 percent.  
 Market risk premium:  We calculate the average market risk premium and multiply by three 
as the estimated average quarterly market risk premium. The quarterly average market risk 
premium from 1993 to 2012 is about 1.6 percent.  
2.5.4 Representative Executive-related Variables 
Number of options granted: From 1993 to 2012 the CEOs from the S&P500 firms receive 
an average of 266,905.0485 shares of stock options.  We round up this number to 267,000 shares.   
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 Usage of DERs on options: The percentage of the options that are granted with DERs.  We 
assume five percent of the executive’s stock option awards are granted with DERs during the 
vesting period.  We also did analysis when the percentage of options that granted with DERs is 2 
percent, 10 percent or 20 percent. 
Non-option wealth: During the period from 1993 to 2012, the average reported annual 
compensation of the CEOs from S&P500 firms is $11.05 million.40  We use $11 million in the 
analysis.  We also examine non-option wealth of $9 million and $13 million.   
Initial asset allocation: At the time when the stock option awards are granted, the 
representative executive has 267,000 stock options that have intrinsic value of zero.  The executive 
is assumed to have non-option related wealth that comes from his cash compensation and stock 
awards.  The initial asset allocation refers to the percentages of the executive’s stock awards.  The 
initial asset allocation of 0%, 33%, 50%, 67% and 100% are considered in the analysis.  We assume 
no rebalancing between cash, firm stocks, and options during the vesting period.  Table 2.1 
summarizes the implied wealth distribution among cash and stocks when different asset allocation 
percentages are used.   
Risk aversion: Hall and Murphy assume the relative risk aversion coefficient to be 2 and 
3.  Chance and Yang also make the same assumption.  We use 3 as the relative risk aversion in the 
analysis.  We also do the analysis when the relative risk aversion is 2 or 4. 
                                                   
40The S&P500 CEO compensation data is obtained from the ExecuComp database.  The sample firms include all the 
firms that have SPCODE = “SP”.  The sample period is from 1993 to 2012.  The data item is the total compensation 
reported by firm (TOTAL_SEC). 
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Table 2.1. Initial Asset Allocation 
 
Initial asset 
allocation (%) 
# of 
stocks 
Cash 
compensation ($) 
# of shares 
underlying options 
# of stocks granted with dividend equivalents  Non-option 
wealth ($) 
        Percentage of stocks underlying options that are 
granted with Des 
  
        2% 5% 10% 20%   
0 0 11,000,000 267,000 5,340 13,350 26,700 53,400 11,000,000 
33 121,000 7,370,000 267,000 5,340 13,350 26,700 53,400 11,000,000 
50 183,333 5,500,000 267,000 5,340 13,350 26,700 53,400 11,000,000 
67 245,667 3,630,000 267,000 5,340 13,350 26,700 53,400 11,000,000 
100 366,667 0 267,000 5,340 13,350 26,700 53,400 11,000,000 
Notes: This table illustrate the representative executive's asset allocation strategy.  The initial asset allocation percentages show how much of his 
non-option related wealth is invested in firm shares.  The rest of non-option wealth is cash compensation and is invested in risk-free bonds.  267,000 
at-the-money stock options are granted to the executive, and some of them are granted with dividend equivalents.  The stock price is $30.  The total 
non-option related wealth is $11 million. 
 
 
2.5.5 Model-related Variables 
Number of time periods: We assume the length of the vesting period to be 1, 2, 3, and 4 
years.  The dividends are issued each quarter, thus the related time periods are 4, 8, 12, and 16 
quarters.   
The accuracy of the simulation results: We use the iterating method to find the numeric 
dollar values and dollar costs.  We use iterations to find the numeric subjective value 𝑉 of dividend 
equivalents.  For example, when dividend equivalents are paid out in cash, we first calculate the 
expected utility of the executive when he receives dividend equivalents in equation (3), then we 
assign a small positive threshold value as the lower bound of the subjective value 𝑉, plug the 
threshold value into equation (2) and compare the result with the expected utility value obtained 
from equation (3).  If it is lower than the expected utility value obtained from equation (3), we add 
one dollar to the threshold and redo the calculation until the result of equation (2) exceeds the 
expected utility value in equation (3).  In each step, the value of the lower bound is increase by 
one dollar.  The value that makes the result of equation (2) greater than the expected utility from 
equation (3) is the higher bound of 𝑉.  The difference between the lower bound and the higher 
bound is one dollar.  
2.6 Simulation Results 
We perform simulations under various scenarios and compare the results in this section.  
The scenarios are described by the combinations of the variables listed above.  We consider two 
types of dividend equivalents granted with executive stock options: cash dividend equivalents and 
dividend equivalents reinvested in firm shares.  The results of the two types of dividend equivalents 
are summarized in two panels of each table, respectively.  The simulation results are presented in 
the following order: Section 2.6.1 summarizes the subjective values and costs of cash dividend 
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equivalents given different combinations of initial asset allocation percentages and vesting periods.  
Section 2.6.2, Section 2.6.3, Section 2.6.4 and Section 2.6.5 discuss the effect of the representative 
executive’s relative risk aversion, his non-option wealth, the amount of dividend equivalents paid 
on each underlying shares, and the length of the vesting period, given different combinations of 
initial asset allocations and usage of DERs on options, respectively.  Section 2.6.6 is a case study 
of an S&P500 firm that granted dividend equivalents on its CEO’ stock options. 
2.6.1 Value and Cost of Dividend Equivalents 
In this section we examine the subjective value of dividend equivalents to the 
representative executive and the cost of them to the firm.  The results are summarized in Table 2.2.  
We allow the asset allocation and the usage of DERs on options to change.  Panel A contains the 
results when the dividend equivalents are paid out in cash, while Panel B contains the results when 
the dividend equivalents are reinvested in firm shares. 
Table 2.2. Effect of Allocation Percentages 
 
Panel A. Cash dividend equivalents 
Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
  2 5 10 20 
0 30,058 75,177 150,376 300,772 
33 30,064 75,183 150,382 300,779 
50 30,068 75,187 150,385 300,782 
67 30,071 75,190 150,389 300,786 
100 30,077 75,196 150,395 300,792 
Costs to the company ($) 30,079 75,199 150,397 300,795 
 
Panel B. Stock dividend equivalents 
Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
  2 5 10 20 
0 24,648 61,623 123,176 246,014 
(Table 2.2 Panel B continued) 
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Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
33 22,487 56,225 112,417 224,655 
50 21,425 53,571 107,126 214,149 
67 20,335 50,848 101,699 203,378 
100 17,858 44,668 89,399 179,038 
Costs to the company ($) 30,079 75,199 150,397 300,795 
Notes: This table provides the subjective value and the cost of dividend equivalents.  Panel A contains 
results for cash dividend equivalents and Panel B contains results for stock dividend equivalents.  Assume 
the options vest in twelve quarters.  The stock price is $30, the exercise price is $30, the risk-free rate is 
0.985% per quarter, the time to expiration is one year, the stock volatility is 50%, the dividend per share is 
$0.5, the stock beta is 1, the market risk premium is 1.5916% per quarter, the representative executive’s 
non-option wealth is $11 million, the number of options awarded is 267,000, with some of them granted 
with DERs, the executive's relative risk aversion is 3, and other variables are indicated in the table below.  
The cost of the DEs are shown in the bottom row. 
We assume that the executive reinvests cash dividend equivalents in risk-free bonds.  The 
subjective value of the cash dividend equivalents is calculated using the utility-based model and 
the cost is the present value of the future cash dividend equivalents.  The costs of cash dividend 
equivalents are not affected by the initial asset allocation, but vary with the usage of DERs on 
options.  The dividend equivalent payments during the vesting period thus can be considered as an 
annuity.  The cost of the dividend equivalents to the firm is the present value of all the dividend 
equivalents that are paid to the executive during the three-year vesting period.  The present value 
of an annuity is determined by the number and size of payments, and the discount rate.  In the 
context of our analysis, the number of payments is determined by the length of the vesting period, 
which is a constant.  The size of payments is determined by the dividend per share, the number of 
options that are awarded to the executive and the percentage of options that are granted with 
dividend equivalents.  We assume the dividend per share is $0.5 each quarter and 267,000 options 
are granted to the executive; thus the size of the annuity payments is only affected by the usage of 
DERs on options.  The discount rate is the risk-free rate.   Initial asset allocation does not influence 
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the value of the annuity.  Usage of DERs on options influence the present value of the annuity 
through the size of the annuity payment.  As the usage of DERs on options increases, the number 
of shares underlying the options that are granted with DERs increases, thus the cost of the dividend 
equivalents to the company increases. 
The results show that the value of the cash dividend equivalents increases as the initial 
asset allocation increases or the usage of DERs on options increases.  The value is always lower 
than the cost.  This is because the representative executive is risk-averse.  The gap between the 
value and the cost of the cash dividend equivalents becomes narrower when the percentage of the 
firm shares in the executive’s portfolio is larger.  Once cash dividend equivalents are delivered to 
the executive, they join the executive’s cash compensation and are essentially risk -free.  Compared 
to cash dividend equivalents, firm shares are risky.  Therefore when the risk-averse executive’s 
portfolio consists of a higher percentage of risky assets, the risk-free assets become more valuable 
to him.  As the usage of DERs on options increases, the amount of the dividend equivalents 
received by the executive increases, thus the value of the dividend equivalents also increases. 
Panel B summarizes the results when the dividend equivalents are paid in the form of firm 
shares that have equivalent value.  When the representative firm pays out common dividends, the 
executive receives firm shares of which the amount equals the dividends paid on one share of firm 
stock divided by the stock price at that time.  Thus the number of shares from dividend equivalents 
on each dividend date is a function of the number of options granted with dividend equivalents, 
the dividends paid on each share of common stock, and the stock price.  Given that the number of 
options granted with dividend equivalents is constant, the executive earns more stock dividend 
equivalents when the dividend per share is higher, or when the stock price is lower, or both.  At 
the end of the vesting period, the cumulated number of shares earned from dividend equivalents is 
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a function of the two series – the amounts of dividend per share over the vesting period, and the 
stock prices on the dates when dividends are paid out.  We assume the dividend per share to be a 
constant number, and thus the cumulated number of shares earned from dividend equivalents is 
dependent only on the stock prices on the ex-dividend dates – in other words, the path of the stock 
price.   
The simulation results for dividend equivalents are summarized in Panel B of Table 2.2.  
First, let us note that as the usage of DERs on options increases the value of stock dividend 
equivalents increases as well.  This is due to the fact that the executive can earn more dividend 
equivalents as more of his options awards are covered by dividend equivalents.  Second, as the 
initial asset allocation percentage increases, the value of the stock dividend equivalents decreases.  
The value is a function of the joint effect:  As the representative executive invests more in firm 
shares, the shares become more important, and the other compensation instruments become 
relatively less important.  The dividend equivalents thus becomes less valuable.  On the other hand, 
the dividend equivalents are paid out in the form of firm shares, and as the firm shares occupy a 
larger portion of the executive’s portfolio, the value of the newly obtained stock dividend 
equivalents becomes higher.  The results show that the second effect plays a smaller role than the 
first.  Third, the comparison of the value and the cost of the dividend equivalents shows that the 
value is much lower than the cost in all combinations of initial asset allocations and usage of DERs 
on options.  This difference, again, can be explained by the risk-averse behavior of the 
representative executive.  The costs are the same as if the dividend equivalents are paid out in cash.  
This is because on the dividend days, the expenses of paying out dividend equivalents in cash and 
paying out in the form of firm shares are the same.  In both cases the expenses are equal to the 
product of dividends per share and the number of shares underlying the options with which 
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dividend equivalents are granted.  Since we assume that the executive does not rebalance his 
investment portfolio and the stock dividend equivalents cannot be freely traded before the options 
vest41, the stock dividend equivalents are illiquid.  The risk-averse executive thus discounts his 
stock dividend equivalents.   
Let us also compare the values of the dividend equivalents when the payment methods are 
different.  For each combination of the initial asset allocation and the usage of DERs on options, 
the value of the dividend equivalents is always higher when they are paid out in cash.  This is due 
to the large discount that the risk-averse executive put on the illiquid stock dividend equivalents.  
The difference between the value of the cash dividend equivalents and the value of stock 
equivalents is greater when the initial asset allocation gets larger.  Considering that the value of 
the cash dividend equivalents does not vary much with the initial asset allocation, the increasing 
difference is mainly driven by the decline in the value of the stock dividend equivalents as the 
initial asset allocation increases.   The difference in the values of cash dividend equivalents and 
stock dividend equivalents also increases when the usage of DERs on options gets larger.  This is 
an effect of increasing scale.  The increase in the difference between the stock dividend equivalents 
and cash dividend equivalents increases approximately in proportion with the growth of the usage 
of DERs on options.  For example, as the usage of DERs on options grows by ten times, from two 
percent to twenty percent, the value difference between increases from $5,410 to $54,758 when 
the initial asset allocation is zero, from $7,577 to $76,124 when the initial asset allocation is 30 
percent, and from $12,219 to $121,754 when the initial asset allocation is 100 percent. 
                                                   
41It is common that when a firm pays dividend equivalents in the form of stocks or units it requires that those stocks 
or units be held in a separate account managed by the firm before the executive’s underlying compensation instruments 
vest.  When those stocks or units are kept in the account, the executive cannot trade them.  Thus we assume that stock 
dividend equivalents cannot be freely traded during the vesting period. 
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2.6.2 The Effect of the Representative Executive’s Relative Risk Aversion 
 In this section we examine the effect of the degree of executive’s relative risk aversion on 
the value and the cost of dividend equivalents.  The relative risk aversion takes a value of 2, 3, or 
4.  The larger the number, the more risk-averse the executive is.  The results are summarized in 
Table 2.3.  Panel A of Table 2.3 contains the results when cash dividend equivalents are paid out, 
and Panel B contains the results when the dividend equivalents are reinvested in firm shares.  In 
each cell, the numbers from the top to the bottom are the values of dividend equivalents for relative 
risk aversion of 2, 3, and 4, respectively.   
Table 2.3. Effect of Risk Aversion 
 
Panel A. Cash dividend equivalents 
Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
  2 5 10 20 
0 30,080 75,199 150,398 300,796 
  30,058 75,177 150,376 300,772 
  30,052 75,171 150,369 300,765 
33 30,080 75,199 150,398 300,796 
  30,064 75,183 150,382 300,779 
  30,062 75,181 150,382 300,776 
50 30,080 75,199 150,398 300,796 
  30,068 75,187 150,385 300,782 
  30,068 75,187 150,385 300,782 
67 30,080 75,199 150,398 300,796 
  30,071 75,190 150,389 300,786 
  30,072 75,192 150,390 300,787 
100 30,080 75,199 150,398 300,796 
  30,077 75,196 150,395 300,792 
  30,078 75,198 150,396 300,794 
Costs to the company ($) 30,079 75,199 150,397 300,795 
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Panel B. Stock dividend equivalents 
Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
  2 5 10 20 
0 25,509 63,756 127,456 254,695 
  24,648 61,623 123,176 246,014 
  24,090 60,227 120,355 240,240 
33 23,723 59,299 118,576 237,067 
  22,487 56,225 112,417 224,655 
  21,631 54,082 108,107 215,938 
50 22,835 57,084 114,163 228,305 
  21,425 53,571 107,126 214,149 
  20,436 51,093 102,148 204,108 
67 21,918 54,798 109,609 219,272 
  20,335 50,848 101,699 203,378 
  19,221 48,057 96,095 192,096 
100 19,823 49,578 99,230 198,752 
  17,858 44,668 89,399 179,038 
  16,516 41,305 82,655 165,483 
Costs to the company ($) 30,079 75,199 150,397 300,795 
Notes:  This table shows the effect of the degree of the representative executive's relative risk aversion on 
the subjective value and the cost of dividend equivalents.  Panel A contains results for cash dividend 
equivalents and Panel B contains results for stock dividend equivalents.  Assume the options vest in twelve 
quarters.  The stock price is $30, the risk-free rate is 0.985% per quarter, the dividend per share is $0.5, the 
stock beta is 1, the market risk premium is 1.5916% per quarter, the representative executive's non-option 
wealth is $11 million, the number of options awarded is 267,000, some of which are granted with DERs, 
the executive's relative risk aversion is 2, 3, or 4, and other variables are indicated in the table below.  In 
each cell the numbers from the top to the bottom are for relative risk aversion of 2, 3, and 4, respectively.  
The cost of the DEs is shown in the bottom row. 
 
 For both of the two payment methods, the value of the dividend equivalents is always 
higher when the executive is less risk averse – in each cell the numbers from the top to the bottom 
are always decreasing.  The effect is measured by the difference between the number in the top of 
each cell and the number on the bottom.  The patterns of the effect of risk aversion are different 
for the two payment methods.  For cash dividend equivalents, overall the effect of the executive’s 
risk aversion is quite small.  The difference between the top number (relative risk aversion of 2) 
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and the bottom number (relative risk aversion of 4) in each cell is always equal to $30 or less.  The 
effect becomes weaker as the initial asset allocation gets larger.  The effect shows a non-monotone 
pattern when the usage of DERs on options gets larger.  When the usage of DERs on options 
increases from two percent to five percent, the value of cash dividend equivalents does not change 
or slightly decreases.  When the usage of DERs on options increases from five percent to 20 
percent, the value of cash dividend equivalents slightly increases.   
For stock dividend equivalents, the effect of the degree of the executive’s risk -aversion is 
much stronger than that of cash dividend equivalents.  The dollar difference between the subjective 
values for risk aversion of 2 and for risk aversion of 4 ranges from $1,419 to $33,269.  The effect 
of the executive’s risk aversion is stronger when the initial asset allocation is larger, or when the 
usage of DERs on options is higher.  As the executive becomes more sensitive to risk, he would 
be more reluctant to increase the portion of risky assets in his portfolio and tends to discount the 
value of stock dividend equivalents more if he already has a large portion of his wealth invested 
in firm shares.  The stronger effect of relative risk aversion associated with higher usage of DERs 
on options again can be seen as a result of increasing scales.   
2.6.3 The Effect of The Executive’s Non-Option Wealth 
 In this section we examine the effect of the level of the representative executive’s non-
option wealth on the value and the cost of the dividend equivalents.  The executive’s non-option 
wealth takes three values: $9 million, $11 million, and $13 million.  The results are summarized 
in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4. Effect of the Representative Executive's Non-Option Wealth 
 
Panel A. Cash dividend equivalents 
Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
 2 5 10 20 
(Table 2.4 Panel A continued) 
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Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
0 30,068 75,187 150,385 300,783 
 30,058 75,177 150,376 300,772 
 30,044 75,163 150,362 300,758 
33 30,071 75,190 150,389 300,786 
 30,064 75,183 150,382 300,779 
 30,054 75,173 150,371 300,768 
50 30,073 75,192 150,391 300,788 
 30,068 75,187 150,385 300,782 
 30,060 75,179 150,377 300,774 
67 30,075 75,194 150,393 300,790 
 30,071 75,190 150,389 300,786 
 30,065 75,184 150,383 300,780 
100 30,078 75,198 150,396 300,794 
 30,077 75,196 150,395 300,792 
 30,075 75,194 150,393 300,790 
Costs to the company ($) 30,079 75,199 150,397 300,795 
Panel B. Stock dividend equivalents 
Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
  2 5 10 20 
0 24,343 60,844 121,595 242,794 
  24,648 61,623 123,176 246,014 
  24,902 62,283 124,518 248,747 
33 22,340 55,846 111,641 223,060 
  22,487 56,225 112,417 224,655 
  22,601 56,528 113,040 225,938 
50 21,327 53,317 106,604 213,075 
  21,425 53,571 107,126 214,149 
  21,499 53,770 107,537 214,997 
67 20,273 50,686 101,366 202,700 
  20,335 50,848 101,699 203,378 
  20,381 50,973 101,957 203,907 
(Table 2.4 Panel B continued) 
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Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
100 17,939 44,622 89,317 178,916 
  17,858 44,668 89,399 179,038 
  17,871 44,703 89,463 179,136 
Costs to the company ($) 30,079 75,199 150,397 300,795 
Notes:  This table shows the effect of the representative executive's non-option wealth on the subjective 
value and the cost of dividend equivalents.  Panel A contains results for cash dividend equivalents and Panel 
B contains results for stock dividend equivalents.  Assume the options vest in twelve quarters.  The stock 
price is $30, the risk-free rate is 0.985% per quarter, the time to expiration is one year, the stock volatility 
is 50%, the dividend per share is $0.5, the stock beta is 1, the market risk premium is 1.5916% per quarter, 
the representative executive's non-option wealth is $9 million, $11 million, or 13 million, the number of 
options awarded is 267,000, some of which are granted with DERs, the executive's relative risk aversion is 
3, and other variables are indicated in the table below.  In each cell, the numbers from the top to the bottom 
are for the executive's non-option wealth of $9 million, $11 million and $13 million, respectively.  The cost 
of the DEs is shown in the bottom row. 
 
 Panel A contains the results when the dividend equivalents are paid out in cash.  For all 
combinations of initial asset allocations and usage of DERs on options, the smallest non-option 
wealth is associated with the highest subjective value of dividend equivalents, and the largest non-
option wealth is associated with the lowest subjective value.  The effect of the executive’s non-
option wealth measured by the difference between the subjective value when the executive has $9 
million non-option wealth and when he has $13 million non-option wealth is not influenced by the 
usage of DERs on options.  As the usage of DERs on options increases from two percent to 20 
percent, the dollar difference changes by at most one dollar, which can be easily explained by 
computation errors in the simulation process.  The effect of the executive’s non-option wealth is 
slightly decreasing as the initial asset allocation increases.  Overall, the executive’s non-option 
wealth has little effect on the subjective value of the cash dividend equivalents.  For all the cells, 
the dollar difference between the number on the top and the number on the bottom is no greater 
than $25. 
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Panel B summarizes the results when the dividend equivalents are reinvested in firm shares.  
It is shown that the effect of the non-option wealth on the value of the dividend equivalents is not 
monotone.  When the executive invests zero percent to sixty-seven percent of his non-option 
wealth in firm shares, the higher the non-option wealth, the greater the subjective value of dividend 
equivalents.  However, when the executive invests all of his non-option wealth in firm shares, the 
higher the non-option wealth, the lower the subjective value of dividend equivalents.  The effect 
of non-option wealth is two-fold.  On the one hand, when the executive’s non-option wealth is 
large, the marginal importance of his option-related wealth is large.  Thus an additional amount of 
income from options is valuable.  This is particularly true when the majority or all of his non-
option wealth is cash.  To diversify his investments, the executive would welcome a small amount 
of risky assets.  Thus we observe that the positive effect of the executive’s non-option wealth is 
the strongest when initial asset allocation is zero.  On the other hand, since dividend equivalents 
are reinvested in firm shares, they become part of the non-option wealth once they are paid out to 
the executive (his non-option wealth consists of cash and firm stock holdings). The utility of an 
additional amount of non-option wealth is smaller when the non-option wealth is large than when 
the non-option wealth is small (the law of diminishing marginal utility).  Similarly, when the 
majority or all of the executive’s non-option wealth is already invested in firm shares.  An 
additional amount of firm shares will not be appreciated and thus are assigned a relatively low 
value.  Thus we observe that when the initial asset allocation is 100 percent, the effect of the 
executive’s non-option wealth is negative. 
2.6.4 The Effect of Dividend Payout Level 
 We examine the effect of the firm’s dividend payout level on the value and the cost of the 
dividend equivalents in this section.  The dividend payout level is measured by the firm’s dividend 
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per share.  We assume that during the vesting period, the dividend per share remains constant.  
Then we examine how the value of the dividend equivalent changes when the dividend per share 
takes on different values.  The results are summarized in Table 2.5 as below. 
Table 2.5. Effect of the Amount of Dividend per Share 
 
Panel A. Cash dividend equivalents 
Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
  2 5 10 20 
0 12,010 30,058 60,137 120,296 
  30,058 75,177 150,376 300,772 
  60,137 150,376 300,772 601,566 
33 12,018 30,066 60,145 120,304 
  30,064 75,183 150,382 300,779 
  60,140 150,378 300,775 601,569 
50 12,022 30,070 60,149 120,308 
  30,068 75,187 150,385 300,782 
  60,142 150,380 300,777 601,571 
67 12,026 30,074 60,153 120,312 
  30,071 75,190 150,389 300,786 
  60,144 150,383 300,780 601,574 
100 12,031 30,079 60,158 120,318 
  30,077 75,196 150,395 300,792 
  60,150 150,388 300,785 601,579 
Costs to the company ($) 12,032 30,080 60,159 120,318 
  30,079 75,199 150,397 300,795 
  60,159 150,398 300,796 601,591 
Panel B. Stock dividend equivalents 
Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
  2 5 10 20 
0 9,848 24,648 49,302 98,566 
  24,648 61,623 123,176 246,014 
(Table 2.5 Panel B continued) 
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Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
  49,302 123,176 246,014 490,672 
33 8,937 22,361 44,728 89,437 
  22,487 56,225 112,417 224,655 
  45,371 113,398 226,624 452,532 
50 8,463 21,171 42,347 84,687 
  21,425 53,571 107,126 214,149 
  43,594 108,974 217,842 435,227 
67 7,945 19,873 39,751 79,510 
  20,335 50,848 101,699 203,378 
  41,905 104,768 209,489 418,758 
100 6,481 16,211 32,450 70,560 
  17,858 44,668 89,399 179,038 
  38,700 96,785 193,638 387,520 
Costs to the company ($) 12,032 30,080 60,159 120,318 
 30,079 75,199 150,397 300,795 
  60,159 150,398 300,796 601,591 
Notes:  This table shows the effect of the dividend payout level on the value and cost of dividend 
equivalents.  Panel A contains results for cash dividend equivalents and Panel B contains results for stock 
dividend equivalents.  Assume the options vest in twelve quarters.  The stock price is $30, the risk-free rate 
is 0.985% per quarter, the time to expiration is one year, the stock volatility is 50%, the dividend per share 
is $0.2, $0.5 and $1, the stock beta is 1, the market risk premium is 1.5916% per quarter, the representative 
executive's non-option wealth is $11 million, the number of options awarded is 267,000, some of which are 
granted with DERs, the executive's relative risk aversion is 3, and other variables are indicated in the table 
below.  In each cell, the numbers from the top to the bottom are for the dividend per share of $0.2, $0.5 and 
$1, respectively.  The cost of the DEs is shown in the bottom row. 
 
 Panel A summarizes the results when the dividend equivalents are paid out in cash.  The 
results are not surprising: for all combinations of initial asset allocation and usage of DERs on 
options, a higher dividend payout level is associated with higher value of the dividend equivalents.  
Similar to the previous sections, we use the difference between the number in the top of each cell 
(dividend per share of $0.2) and the number in the bottom of each cell (dividend per share of $1) 
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to measure the effect of the dividend per share.  The effect is not influenced by the initial asset 
allocation, but it is becoming proportionally stronger with the usage of DERs on options. 
 Panel B contains the results when the dividend equivalents are reinvested in firm shares.  
Again the higher dividend payout level leads to a higher value of the dividend equivalents.  As the 
initial asset allocation percentage becomes larger, the effect of the dividend per share becomes 
weaker.  This is due to the decreasing marginal benefit that stock dividend equivalents bring as the 
firm stock accounts for an increasing portion of the executive’s non-option wealth.  The results 
show that the spread between the subjective value when dividend per share is $0.2 and the 
subjective value when dividend per share is $1 becomes wider when the usage of DERs on options 
increases, and again the increase in the spread is approximately proportional to the increase of the 
usage of DERs on options.42  
2.6.5 The Effect of Vesting Period 
 We examine the effect of the vesting period on the value and the cost of dividend 
equivalents on options in this section.  The vesting periods that we examine are one, two, three, 
and four years.  The corresponding compounding periods are thus four, eight, twelve and sixteen 
quarters.  The results are summarized in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6.  Effect of Vesting Period 
 
Panel A. Cash dividend equivalents 
Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
  2 5 10 20 
0 10,404 26,037 52,093 104,203 
  20,424 51,088 102,197 204,414 
  30,058 75,177 150,376 300,772 
                                                   
42One should not conclude that the effect itself becomes stronger as the usage of DERs on options gets larger.  The 
wider spread between the top number and the bottom number in each cell is due to the fact that more options are 
granted with dividend equivalents.  The effect on the “per option” basis does not change much. 
(Table 2.6 Panel A continued) 
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Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
  39,322 98,339 196,702 393,426 
33 10,408 26,040 52,096 104,206 
  20,428 51,093 102,202 204,419 
  30,064 75,183 150,382 300,779 
  39,329 98,346 196,708 393,433 
50 10,410 26,042 52,098 104,209 
  20,432 51,096 102,205 204,422 
  30,068 75,186 150,385 300,782 
  39,332 98,349 196,712 393,437 
67 10,413 26,045 52,101 104,211 
  20,435 51,100 102,209 204,426 
  30,071 75,190 150,389 300,786 
  39,336 98,353 196,716 393,441 
100 10,417 26,049 52,106 104,216 
  20,441 51,105 102,214 204,431 
  30,077 75,196 150,395 300,792 
  39,342 98,959 196,722 393,447 
Costs to the company ($) 10,422 26,055 52,110 104,221 
  20,443 51,109 102,217 204,435 
  30,080 75,199 150,398 300,796 
  39,345 98,363 196,726 393,451 
Panel B. Stock dividend equivalents 
Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
  2 5 10 20 
0 9,690 24,250 48,514 97,034 
  17,709 44,293 88,579 177,071 
  24,648 61,623 123,176 246,014 
  30,803 76,976 153,762 356,722 
33 9,285 23,235 46,484 92,983 
  16,454 41,154 82,312 164,596 
(Table 2.6 Panel B continued) 
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Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 DER usage (%) 
  22,487 56,225 112,417 224,655 
  27,786 69,452 138,791 277,096 
50 9,073 22,703 45,420 90,859 
  15,815 39,555 79,121 158,247 
  21,425 53,571 107,126 214,149 
  26,346 65,855 131,630 262,912 
67 8,849 22,139 44,292 88,612 
  15,141 37,870 75,758 151,562 
  20,335 50,848 101,699 203,378 
  24,907 62,263 124,478 248,743 
100 8,339 20,860 41,737 83,525 
  13,528 33,839 67,731 135,659 
  17,858 44,668 89,399 179,038 
  21,838 54,608 109,248 218,612 
Costs to the company ($) 10,422 26,055 52,110 104,221 
  20,443 51,109 102,217 204,435 
  30,080 75,199 150,398 300,796 
  39,345 98,363 196,726 393,451 
Notes:  This table shows the effect of vesting period on the subjective value and the cost of dividend 
equivalents.  Panel A contains results for cash dividend equivalents and Panel B contains results for stock 
dividend equivalents.  Assume the options vest in 4, 8, 12, or 16 quarters.  The stock price is $30, the risk-
free rate is 0.985% per quarter, the time to expiration is one year, the stock volatility is 50%, the dividend 
per share is $0.5, the stock beta is 1, the market risk premium is 1.5916% per quarter, the representative 
executive's non-option wealth is $11 million, the number of options awarded is 267,000, some of which are 
granted with DERs, the executive's relative risk aversion is 3, and other variables are indicated in the table 
below.  In each cell, the numbers from the top to the bottom are for the vesting period of 4, 8, 12, and 16 
quarters, respectively. The cost of the DEs are shown in the bottom row. 
 
 For both of the two payment methods, the subjective value of dividend equivalents are 
larger when the vesting period is longer.  This is anticipated because a longer vesting period means 
that more dividends and dividend equivalents are paid out.   
 For cash dividend equivalents, the effect of the vesting period is hardly influenced by initial 
asset allocation or usage of DERs on options.  For example, when the usage of DERs on options 
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is five percent, as the initial asset allocation increases from zero to 100 percent, the difference 
between the subjective value of dividend equivalents for 16 quarters and 4 quarters increases by 
$8, from $72,302 to $72,310.  At all levels of initial asset allocation, when the usage of DERs on 
options grows by ten times, the difference between the subjective values increase by around ten 
times as well.   
 For stock dividend equivalents, the effect of the vesting period becomes weaker as the 
initial asset allocation is greater.  This pattern, again, can be explained by the decreasing marginal 
benefit that stock dividend equivalents can bring when the executive invests more of his non-
option wealth in firms shares.  The effect of the vesting period is larger when the usage of DERs 
on options gets larger.  As the usage of DERs on options grows from two percent to twenty percent, 
the spread between the top number and the bottom number in each cell increases by more than ten 
percent.  This increase itself is greater when the initial asset allocation is smaller.  When the initial 
asset allocation is zero, the spread increases by 12.3 times, while for the initial asset allocation of 
one hundred percent, the spread increases by only 10.0 times.  This pattern is consistent with the 
notion that a risk-averse executive prefers to diversify his investments, so he values the stock 
dividend equivalents more when the majority of his non-option wealth is cash.   
2.6.6 A Case Study - Norfolk Southern Corp.’s Dividend Equivalent Grants 
In this section we take real examples to illustrate the effects of various factors on the value 
and the cost of dividend equivalents. We choose an S&P500 firm that has granted the CEO 
dividend equivalents on his stock option awards.  Below is the company profile on its official web 
site: 
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Norfolk Southern Corporation is one of the nation’s premier transportation 
companies. Its Norfolk Southern Railway subsidiary operates approximately 
20,000 route miles in 22 states and the District of Columbia, serves every major 
container port in the eastern United States, and provides efficient connections to 
other rail carriers. Norfolk Southern operates the most extensive intermodal 
network in the East and is a major transporter of coal and industrial products. 
(NorfolkSouthern) 
The company has a long history of granting dividend equivalents on its executive’s stock 
option awards.  In the early 1990s the company paid dividend equivalents in cash, but in the late 
1990s, the company switched from cash dividend equivalents to stock dividend equivalents.  We 
choose two of its option grants to the CEO as examples, one for cash dividend equivalents and the 
other for stock dividend equivalents. 
Cash dividend equivalents 
In 1993 the company granted 40,000 shares of options to its CEO, D. R. Goode 
(NorfolkSouthern 1993).  The options would vest in one year and expire in 10 years.  The option 
strike price was $63.25.  At that time, the company made quarterly dividends.  In the fiscal year 
1993, the four quarterly dividend payments were $0.45, $0.45, $0.48, and $0.48.  Instant cash 
dividend equivalent payments were made to the CEO on those options.   In addition to the option 
award, the CEO received a salary of $535,000, a bonus of $376,480, and cash dividend equivalents 
earned from his other options performance stocks that were granted before 1993.  The CEO also 
had earned performance shares for the performance period ending December 31, 1993, 1992, and 
1991, all of which were paid to him in the form of common shares. The CEO had other 
compensation of $50,480.43 
Like other U.S. large firms, Norfolk Southern Corporation had complicated compensation 
packages for its senior executives.  We have to carefully tailor the CEO’s compensation package 
                                                   
43See the company’s 1993 proxy statement available at the SEC web site: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/702165/0000950109-94-000621.txt 
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before applying our model.  The two main differences between Mr. Goode’s compensation 
package and the compensation package in our model are: First, Mr. Goode had sizable 
compensation coming from the company’s long term incentive plan: the performance stock 
awards, etc.  Second, he did not receive common share awards.  However those differences can be 
easily adjusted for in this particular example.  We know how many performance shares are earned 
by the CEO in 1993 and the earned performance shares are paid out in the form of common shares.  
Thus we can treat the earned out-performance stocks as common share awards.  Meanwhile we 
ignore the new performance share awards that were granted in 1993.  By doing this, we are able 
to keep the model simple, but we may underestimate the CEO’s stock holding.   
First we examined the effect of the executive’s relative risk aversion on the value and the 
cost of cash dividend equivalents.  The cost of the cash dividend equivalents, again, equals the 
present value of the four dividend equivalent payments during the one-year vesting period.  The 
cost is not affected by the CEO’s risk aversion and is equal to $192,543.  When the relative risk 
aversion measure takes a value of 3, the subjective value of the dividend equivalents is $192,542.  
When the relative risk aversion measure equals 2, the subjective value is $192,543, a difference is 
only $1.  We also calculated the subjective value of the dividend equivalents when the CEO’s 
relative risk aversion is 4 and 5.  The results show that changing the relative risk aversion makes 
only one or two dollars difference.  Second, we let the CEO change his investment strategy.  When 
the initial asset allocation percentage changes from zero percent to 100 percent, the subjective 
value of cash dividend equivalents increases only by one dollar.  Next, we examined the effect of 
non-option wealth and the effect of the dividend payout level.  The simulation results show that 
those effects are all extremely small.  The subjective value of cash dividend equivalents is always 
smaller than the cost, but the difference is less than $2.    
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Stock dividend equivalents 
In 1998, the company paid stock dividend equivalents on the CEO’s stock options.  The 
company granted 250,000 stock options, all of which earned dividend equivalents.  The strike price 
was $32.1563.  The dividend equivalents are reinvested in Deferred Stock Units, which are payable 
in cash to the executive when either one of three conditions are met:  (a) it is the five-year 
anniversary of the date of option grant; (b) the CEO exercises the option (exercises of less than the 
full option grant result in a prorated cash payment); and (c) the CEO is dead, disabled, or retired 
(NorfolkSouthern 1998).  We follow the same procedure to summarize the CEO’s other 
compensation:  The executive received $3.402 million non-option related compensation, of which 
$1.615 million were shares and the rest were cash compensation.  The company paid $0.2 
dividends each quarter. 44   
According to the company’s disclosure, the Deferred Stock Units are paid at the aggregate 
fair market value.  In other word, dividend equivalents are cumulated in the form of shares but are 
paid out in cash of the same value.  In our model, the final payment method will not affect our 
analysis as long as the dividend equivalents are cumulated in the form of shares.  The three 
conditions for the Deferred Stock Units to become payable add to the complexity of the analysis, 
but only by a limited amount:  Condition (c) involves some events with very small probabilities 
thus should not bother us.  Condition (b) seems to be difficult to model.  The executive will not 
exercise the options if the stock price falls below the strike price.  The options will be forfeited if 
not exercised before the expiration date.  It is implied that the related dividend equivalents might 
be forfeited too.  However this possibility will not affect our analysis since we are only interested 
in the dividend equivalents that have been cumulated during the one-year vesting period.  Before 
                                                   
44Norfolk Southern Corp 1998 proxy statement. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/702165/0000928385-99-
001086.txt 
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the options vest the CEO cannot exercise them thus all the four quarters’ dividend equivalents on 
the options are cumulated.  Those dividend equivalents will become payable if any one of the two 
events occurs – either the CEO exercises the options before the five-year anniversary (of the date 
of option grant), or the five-year anniversary comes before the CEO exercises the options.  If the 
first event occurs the dividend equivalents will become payable within four years after the options 
vest.  If the second event occurs the dividend equivalents will become payable exactly four years 
after they vest.  Either way the stock dividend equivalents are delivered to the CEO.  The stock 
options expires ten years after granted so they are still exercisable on the five-year anniversary.  
Thus the possibility that the dividend equivalents cumulated during the vesting period become 
forfeited due to the stock options being expired is zero.  The possibility for the events in Condition 
(3) to occur before the five-year anniversary is small.  Even if such events occur the dividend 
equivalents cumulated during the vesting period will be paid to the CEO.  After considering all the 
possibilities described above we conclude that the probability for the dividend equivalents 
cumulated during the vesting period to be forfeited is zero.   
The results show that the cost of the dividend equivalents cumulated during the one – year 
vesting period has a cost of $192,543 to the company.  When the executive has relative risk 
aversion of 2 the value of the dividend equivalents is $168,523.  When the executive has relative 
risk aversion of 3 the value is $164,173, a decrease of three percent.  The subjective value of the 
dividend equivalents is 85% to 88% of their cost to the firm. 
In order to maintain the simplicity of the model, we take the earned performance stock as 
the common stock awards.  Now let us loosen this assumption and let the allocation percentage 
(the percentage of stock in total non-option wealth) vary from zero percent to 100 percent.  The 
length of the vesting period is still one year. 
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Let us first see the effect of relative risk aversion given different initial asset allocation 
percentages.  The effect is shown in Figure 2.2. It summarizes the results in a straightforward way: 
The solid line shows the cost of the dividend equivalents and the two bars represent the value of 
the dividend equivalents.  The light downward diagonal filled bars are for the risk aversion of 2 
and the solid filled bars are for the risk aversion of 3.  As the very risk-averse executive (risk 
aversion measure = 3) invests more of his non-option wealth in firm shares, the subjective value 
of the dividend equivalents drops rapidly from $171,775 to $153,339, a decrease of 11 percent.  
When the executive is less risk averse (pho=2), the drop of the subjective value of the dividend 
equivalents was smaller: from $174,419 to $160,523, a drop of eight percent. 
 
Figure 2.2. Case Study – Effect of Relative Risk Aversion 
According to Norfolk Southern Corporation’s annual disclosure of executive 
compensation, its CEO compensation changes greatly each year.  For example, the CEO received 
4,000 options in 1996, 1,200 options in 1997, and 2,500 options in 1998.  In 2002 the options that 
were granted to the CEO reached to a peak of 6,500.  The cash compensation also varies from year 
to year.  In 1995 the total cash compensation paid to the CEO was around $1.5 million.  In 1998 
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the CEO’s cash compensation was around $2.5 million.  The stock award to the CEO was also 
quite volatile.  In 1994 the CEO received $0.5 million worth of common shares, and in 1997 he 
received $2.5 million worth of common shares.  We want to capture the variation of the CEO’s 
non-option wealth in our analysis.  So we let the non-option wealth change from $1 million to $4 
million.  This range covers the CEO’s actual non-option compensation in the 1990s.  The results 
are represented in Figure 2.3 below. 
The axis on the left shows the value of the dividend equivalents while the axis on the right 
shows the cost.  The plot shows that there is an interaction effect between the non-option wealth 
and the initial asset allocation.  When the CEO has less than 80% of this non-option wealth invested 
in firm shares, the higher the non-option wealth the greater the value of the dividend equivalents.  
When the CEO invests 80% to 90 % of his non-option wealth in firm shares, receiving more or 
less non-option compensation will not affect his feeling about the dividend equivalents.  When he 
continue to invest more of his non-option wealth in firm shares, the more non-option wealth he 
has, the smaller value of the dividend equivalents to him.  
 
Figure 2.3. Case Study – Effect of Non-option Wealth 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
150000
155000
160000
165000
170000
175000
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
V
al
u
e 
/ 
C
o
st
 (
$
)
Initial Asset Allocation
Effect of Non-option Wealth
1 million 2 million 3 million
3.402 million 4 million Costs
 108 
  
The company’s dividend payout was volatile.  From the 1993 to 2000 the highest annual 
dividend payout was $2.24 and the lowest was $0.80.  The average annual dividend payout was 
$1.50.  We want to show the effect of dividend payout level on the value and the cost of dividend 
equivalents.  We thus allow the quarterly dividend payout to change from $0.15 to $0.45, which 
is a good approximate of the firm’s reality.  The results are summarized in Table 2.7 and Figure 
2.4.  The aggregate value of dividend equivalents naturally increases as the dividend per share 
dividend increases.  The subjective value is always lower than the cost of the dividend equivalents.  
At each level of initial asset allocation, the difference between the value and the cost of dividend 
equivalents gets larger when the dividend per share gets larger.  The value spread between the 
lowest dividend per share and the highest dividend per share gets narrower as the initial asset 
allocation gets larger.  This pattern can be seen in the plot titled “Effect of Dividend per Share”.   
Table 2.7. Case Study – Effect of Dividend per Share 
Initial asset allocation (%) Value to the executives ($) 
 Dividend per Share 
  $0.15 $0.20 $0.25 $0.30 $0.35 $0.40 $0.45 
10 128,877 171,775 214,645 257,489 300,309 343,106 385,881 
20 127,817 170,371 212,902 255,411 297,900 340,371 382,823 
30 126,682 168,870 211,041 253,195 295,335 337,461 379,575 
40 125,458 167,253 209,039 250,815 292,583 334,344 376,098 
50 124,127 165,498 206,868 248,238 289,608 330,979 372,351 
60 122,668 163,577 204,497 245,427 286,367 327,319 368,281 
70 121,054 161,456 201,882 242,333 282,807 323,305 363,824 
80 119,248 159,088 198,970 238,894 278,857 318,858 358,897 
90 117,202 156,411 195,686 235,023 274,421 313,876 353,387 
100 114,874 153,339 191,926 230,605 269,370 308,217 347,143 
Cost to the Company ($) 144,407 192,543 240,678 288,814 336,949 385,085 433,221 
Notes: This table shows the effect of dividend per share on the subjective value and the cost of dividend 
equivalents.  Assume the options vest in four quarters.  The stock price is $32.1563, the risk-free rate is 
0.985% per quarter, the time to expiration is ten years, the stock volatility is 50%, the dividend per share is 
$0.15, $0.20, $0.25, $0.30, $0.35, $0.40, or $0.45, the stock beta is 1, the market risk premium is 1.5916% 
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per quarter, the representative executive's non-option wealth is $3.402 million, the number of options 
awarded is 250,000, all of which are granted with DERs, the executive's relative risk aversion is 3, and 
other variables are indicated in the table below.  The cost of the DEs is shown in the bottom row. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Case Study – Effect of Dividend per Share 
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Since we assume the size of the executive’s option award to be constant, the changes in his non-
option wealth will affect the relative size of the executive’s option compensation to other types of 
compensation.  When the executive has higher non-option wealth, the option compensation 
accounts for a smaller portion in his full compensation package.  For cash dividend equivalents, 
smaller non-option wealth is associated with a larger subjective value of dividend equivalents.  For 
stock dividend equivalents, the effect of the executive’s non-option wealth is not monotone.  When 
the initial asset allocation percentage is low to medium high, high non-option wealth is associated 
with a high subjective valuation.  When the initial asset allocation percentage is very high, the 
relation is reversed.   
 The model in this paper can be modified and applied to the dividend equivalent rights that 
are granted on performance stocks.45  DERs granted on performance stocks are becoming more 
popular among U.S. large firms.  A challenge in modifying the model is to account for the 
achievement of performance goals.  The risks assumed in performance stocks as well as in DERs 
on the performance stocks are strongly affected by the performance goals and how likely those 
goals can be achieved.  The performance goals can consist of a series of accounting objectives and 
stock return objectives.  The variation in the performance goals brings great complexity to the 
model, and the difficulty to achieve the performance goals is difficult to measure.  One way to 
capture the risks assumed in performance stocks and DERs granted on performance stocks is that 
we can assume that the performance goals are purely based on stock returns and dividend growth.  
For example, the performance shares will be earned by the executive if the average annual stock 
return during the performance period exceeds ten percent, or the cumulated dividend growth rate 
over the performance period is greater than the industry average.  To summarize, the model in this 
                                                   
45With proper modification the model can be applied to performance-vested restricted stocks as well, due to the 
similarity between performance shares and performance-vested restricted stock. 
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paper can be used to value the dividend equivalents granted on various performance-based 
compensation instruments albeit with significant modifications.  
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APPENDIX A. CLASSIFICATION AND CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT 
The most commonly seen underlying shares of DERs are stock units, which are the 
elements of a grant valued in terms of company stock but in which shares are not issued at the time 
of the grant.  Dividends paid on executives’ incentive stock awards are referred to as dividend 
equivalents, and the right to receive dividend equivalents is referred to as dividend equivalent 
rights (DERs).  
Instruments that can be granted with DERs include executive stock options, restricted stock 
or units, performance stocks or units, and other equity-based stock awards.  Payments can be made 
in the form of cash, common shares, or incentive shares of equivalent value.  The provisions 
regarding DERs contain details such as the amount of DEs paid, how and when the payments of 
DEs will be made, and whether the DE payments are subject to certain time-based or performance-
based conditions or both. 
Our sample of unearned shares includes executives’ unvested performance-based restricted 
stock or units, unearned performance stock or units, shares covered by unexercised executive stock 
options, and shares covered by stock appreciation rights. Unvested shares include unvested time-
based restricted stock or units. 
A typical performance stock award has four key elements: the award size, the performance 
goals, the performance period and the vesting schedule.  The award size is the number of shares 
that can be earned by an executive if certain conditions are met.  A small number of firms allow 
executives to earn more shares than the award size.  Performance goals are the criteria to which 
the performance of an executive is compared.  Performance benchmarks typically include stock 
market measures as well as dividend yield and accounting variables such as total shareholder 
return, net income, or sales growth.  The performance period is the time interval over which an 
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executive’s performance is measured.  In most cases, the performance period is three years.  During 
the performance period the underlying shares of the performance stock award are not owned by 
executives.  As such the award is said to be fully risky.  At the end of the performance period, the 
number of shares earned by the executive is determined, issued, and credited to the executive as a 
shareholder. A vesting period is not a necessity.  Some stock awards have one while others do not.  
Most firms require that stock awards earned by executives vest over a certain period of time.  
Earned performance shares are similar to restricted stocks.  Some firms do not require the share 
awards to have a vesting period.  Once the shares are earned, the holder enjoys full rights as a 
stockholder.  Figure A.1 gives a graphical representation of the performance period and vesting 
period of performance stock awards.  Dividend equivalent payments on performance shares during 
the performance period are of interest in this study.  Dividend equivalents on unearned 
performance shares can be paid in cash or in additional shares. 
Executive stock options are contracts that give the executives the right but not the 
obligation to buy shares at an agreed-upon price.  When the stock options are exercised, the 
executive receives the shares and all rights as shareholders from then on.  Executive stock options 
sometimes have vesting periods during which certain restrictions may apply.  Stock options expire 
if the executives fail to exercise the options, which will occur if the stock price fails to achieve the 
exercise price.  The shares covered by executive stock options are not owned by the executives 
before being exercised. Stock options as a means of compensating executives are less common 
today than ten years ago. Many online resources still define DERs as the dividend rights on the 
shares covered by executive stock options, showing that the combination of DERs and executive 
stock options was once common. Restricted stock units and performance stock have greatly 
reduced the use of stock options.  Our sample collected from S&P500 firms shows that around two 
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percent of firms disclose that they have paid dividends on shares covered by executive stock 
options.  Figure A.2 gives a graphical presentation of dividend equivalent payments made on 
shares covered by unexercised stock options. Dividend equivalents on options can be paid in cash, 
shares, or additional stock options. 
 
 
Figure A.1. Example of DERs on Performance Stocks 
Notes:  DEs paid on the shares during the performance period are classified as “DEs on unearned shares. 
 
 
Figure A.2. Example of DERs on Options 
Notes: DERs on stock options.  DEs paid on the shares covered by stock options prior to the exercise of 
stock options are classified as “DEs on unearned shares. 
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Restricted stock is an important alternative to stock options. The most common type of 
restricted stock is time-vested restricted stock. The vesting condition of restricted stock is that the 
recipient stays employed by the firm for specified period of time. Restricted stock is not 
transferable prior to being vested. Time-vested restricted stock is owned by the recipients. A less 
commonly-seen type is performance-vested restricted stock. It is similar to unearned performance 
stock in that the vesting conditions include performance goals. For instance, Xcel Energy Inc. 
requires that the restricted stock units granted after 2004 vest upon satisfaction of criteria including 
achievement of total shareholder return of 27 percent (XcelEnergy). Shares are subject to forfeiture 
if the pre-set performance goals are not met. Therefore we consider unvested performance-vested 
restricted stock as unearned stock. If a firm pays dividends on CEO’s unvested performance-vested 
restricted stocks, we count it is a DER firm and include the observation in the DER sample. 
Restricted stock units are frequently referred to as “a sibling of restricted stock”.  They 
share some similarities in vesting conditions and vesting periods.  There are, however, some 
differences between restricted stock and restricted stock units.  The process of granting, vesting, 
and delivering of restricted stock units may not actually involve real shares and may be settled in 
cash. The actual shares vested and delivered to the recipients may depend on how the performance 
goals are reached.  Restricted stock units have become popular in the last 10 years.  Restricted 
stock units can be time-vested or performance-vested.  If a firm pays dividends on a CEO’s 
unvested performance-vested restricted stock units, we count it is a DER firm and include it in the 
DER sample. 
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APPENDIX B. DESCRIPTIONS OF VARIBLES 
Variable  Definition 
DER_POLICY Categorical variable. =1 if the firm allows DE payments on CEOs’ 
unearned shares in year t; =0 otherwise 
DER_PAYME
NT 
Categorical variable. =1 if the firm makes DE payments on CEOs’ 
unearned shares in year t; =0 otherwise 
Payout measures: 
DIV/ASSETS Total annual common dividends over total book value of assets 
DIV/OPERAT
ING INCOME 
DIV/OIBDP where OIBDP is operating income before depreciation  
DIV/EBIT DIV/EBIT where EBIT is earnings before interests and taxes 
DIV/NI DIV/NI where NI is net income 
   Dividend 
yield 
DIV/stock price at fiscal year end 
   Repurchase 
payout ratio 
Annual expenditure on the purchase of common and preferred stocks / 
Total Assets 
   DIVDUM Categorical variable = 1 if annual common dividend > 0; = 0 otherwise 
Accounting variables: 
   A Total book value of assets in year t 
   MEDecile NYSE decile of market value of equity, which equals stock price times 
common shares outstanding 
   V/A Market value of the firm / Total Assets 
Market value of the firm = Total Assets – Book Equity + Market Equity; 
Book Equity = Stockholder’s Equity – Preferred Stock + Balance Sheet 
Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit – Post Retirement Assets 
   dA/A Growth rate of firm assets in year t.  
dA in year t = Total assets in year t – Total Asset in year t-1;   
dA/A=( Total assets in year t – Total Asset in year t-1)/Total assets in year t 
   E/A Earnings Before Interest/Total Asset. 
Earnings Before Interest = Earnings Before Extraordinary Items + Interest 
Expense + Deferred Income Taxes (income) 
   FCF/A Free Cash Flow/Total Asset 
Free Cash Flow = Operating Income Before Depreciation – Capital 
Expenditures 
   ROA Return on Assets.  =Net income / Total Asset 
   LEV Leverage.  = (Long Term Debt – Cash Holding)/Total Asset 
   Market-to-
book Ratio 
=ME/BE. 
BE is Book Equity, as defined  by Professor Kenneth French:  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/varia
ble_definitions.html  
Corporate governance measures: 
   E-index Bebchuk Entrenchment Index 
   Interlock = 1 if CEO is also on the compensation committee; = 0 otherwise 
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   Dualrole = 1 if CEO is also the board chair; = 0 otherwise 
   Board size Number of directors on board 
CEO characteristics and compensation: 
   CEO age Age of the CEO 
   Tenure Number of years the person serves as CEO 
   New CEO = 1 if it is within the person’s first 18 months of being CEO; = 0 otherwise 
   Totcomp Total compensation.  = salary + bonus + restricted stock awards 
   Cashcomp Cash compensation.  = salary + bonus 
Risk factors: 
   MKT Market excess return.  Market portfolio return – risk free rate 
   HML High-minus-low.  From Fama&French three-factor model 
   SMB Small-minus-big.  From Fama&French three-factor model 
Others:  
   SP500_93 Dummy variable. =1 if the firm is a SP500 firm in 1993; =0 otherwise 
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